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A changing threat environment, decreasing defense budget, and need for
modernization are forcing the Acquisition Process to reform policies and procedures. The
Acquisition Process must develop initiatives to reduce both program cycle time and program
cost to meet the challenges presented by this new acquisition environment. The objectives
of this thesis are to explore the overall cycle time and cost growth trends in Army
Acquisition Programs, and determine how program schedule growth affects program cost.
This analysis is relevant in facilitating development of acquisition reform initiatives targeted
at reducing program schedule and cost. This study concludes that Army programs
experience average cycle time growth of 19.6 months and average cost growth of 49.9%. A
significant research finding is that Army programs demonstrate a relationship between
schedule growth and cost growth. This research also reveals that program cost growth,
identified in the SARs as being induced by schedule growth, is only 14.3% of cost growth
adjusted for quantity change. This thesis suggests that schedule growth has a much larger
effect on cost growth than indicated in the SARs. This research intends to function as an
overview of Army Acquisition Program schedule and cost growth, and the relationship
between these two important program elements. This thesis generated numerous results that
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My No. 1 priority is to get systems fielded that will be useful to our combat
forces and to do that as quickly and with as low a cost as we possibly can.
The military advantage goes to the nation who has the best cycle time to
capture technologies that are commercially available, incorporate them in
weapon systems and get them fielded first (Kaminski, 1997, p.2).
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this research is to determine Army Acquisition Programs' cycle time
and cost variation, and determine if a statistical relationship exists between schedule and
cost variation. Cycle time and cost data are obtained for the Army Acquisition Programs
from the DoD Cycle Time Analysis Tool (CTAT) and from Selected Acquisition Reports
(SAR), respectively. Two groups of Army Programs are analyzed: twenty-one programs
that incorporate the entire acquisition cycle from Milestone I (MS I) to Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) and fourteen modification programs that incorporate a modified cycle time
from MS II to IOC. This research will provide acquisition workforce personnel with a better
understanding of the relationship between a program's schedule and cost. It will also help
measure the effects of documented program changes in terms of estimated cycle time and
cost variation.
This research will facilitate the development of future acquisition cycle time and
cost reform initiatives. If a correlation between a program's schedule and cost exists, then
policy makers can target reform initiatives to reduce cycle time. A reduced cycle time will
also provide the added benefit of a reduced program cost. If no correlation exists between
schedule and cost, policy makers must then develop reform initiatives that target cycle time
and cost reduction separately.
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B. BACKGROUND
In July 1999, the House Appropriation Committee voted to stop production of the
F-22 Raptor, and cut $1.8 Billion of the $3 Billion requested for this program in FY 2000
funding (Associated Press, 1999). This action was initiated because of cost growth
problems in the F-22 program. Development costs are projected to increase by $1
Billion, and the overall F-22 program cost is projected to increase by $13 Billion. The
per unit cost has doubled to $184 Million per airplane (Schneider, 1999). The RAH-66
Comanche is experiencing similar problems. This aircraft's unit cost has doubled since
1985 and the program's schedule has slipped by 81 months (GAO Report, 1992). These
two programs are only two examples of a larger defense acquisition problem.
Cost growth and schedule delays are two of the oldest, most visible, and common
problems associated with the acquisition of military weapon systems. Programs, across
the services, have commonly experienced cost growths of 20 to 40% and many programs
experience cost growth much higher than 40%. Also almost every DoD program
experiences schedule slippage, with some program schedules slipping by over 4 years.
(GAO Report, 1992)
The Defense System Affordability Council (DSAC) is recommending that the
acquisition program cycle time be reduced by as much as 50%. Department of Defense
(DoD) personnel believe that this cycle time reduction will reduce program cost and
improve effectiveness. (White Paper, 1997) DoD personnel believe that cost and
schedule are interdependent. "A schedule delay, assuming program scope is not reduced,
will likely drive cost up (GAO Report, 1992, p.7)." The opposite should also hold true,
schedule reduction should decrease program cost. However, before implementing
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policies aimed at reducing cycle time; further research needs to be completed to
understand actual cycle time and cost variations within military services, and the
interrelationship between these two essential aspects of an acquisition program.
At this time, many conditions are converging which are increasing the importance
of program cycle time and cost variation research. The three main conditions are the
change in threat environment, decreasing defense budget, and the need for modernization.
Understanding acquisition program cycle time and cost variation is necessary to solve
some of the challenges presented by these convergent conditions.
1. Change in Threat Environment
The current DoD Acquisition Process is structured to solve technical problems
based on a stable, known threat. However, the United States no longer faces a single
threat like the former Soviet Union. Macgregor (1997) states that a revolution in military
affairs (RMA) as occurred in the post-Cold War era. The future battlefield has become
fluid and complex, focusing on peacekeeping operations like Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, and
Kosovo. Today's United States military forces must be able to react to various threats.
Sanders (1997) states, "in statistical terms, the mean value of our single greatest threat is
considerably reduced, however, the variance of the collective threat has increased" (p.l).
The average cycle time for DoD Acquisition Programs, program initiation to
Initial Operational Capability, is estimated to be 9 to 11 years. The commercial sector is
developing technological innovations at a much faster pace. The commercial computer
sector's technology cycle is between 12 to 18 months. (White Paper, 1997)
2. DoD Budget Decrease
During this same period, the defense budget has decreased from a high of $418.4
billion in 1985 to the current level of $257.3 billion, a 38.5% decrease. Within the
defense budget, the Procurement account has decreased from $136.4 billion or 32.6% of
the overall defense budget to $48.7 billion or 18.9% of the defense budget. The
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) account has decreased from
$45.1 billion or 10.8% of the overall defense budget to $36.1 billion or 14.0% of the
defense budget. (Defense Budget Materials, 1999)
3. Need for Modernization
To further compound the current situation, the equipment and systems currently
used by DoD soldiers are nearing the end of their expected lifetime. These systems will
soon need to be replaced with upgraded systems incorporating the newest technology. The
military must be able to develop, produce, and field these new systems within the constraints
of the reduced defense budget and at an accelerated cycle time required to adapt to an ever-
changing threat environment. Programs that take decades to develop increase cost and are
less effective when eventually fielded to the operational user. The operational user deserves
a system that incorporates the latest technology, which can be fielded quickly to meet threat
requirements.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
How do variations in Army Acquisition Program cycle time affect program cost?
2. Secondary Research Questions
a. What is the traditional DoD Acquisition Process?
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b. Why is program acquisition cycle time and cost variation important?
c. What are Selected Acquisition Reports and why are they important?
d. What are program cycle time and cost and how are they determined within the
Acquisition Process?
e. What are the cycle time and cost variation in Army Acquisition Programs?
D. SCOPE OF THESIS
This research examines SAR cycle time and cost data in order to analyze the cycle
time and cost variation relationship of selected Army Acquisition Programs from 1969 to
1998. The Army Acquisition Programs are divided into two major groups: twenty-one full
acquisition cycle programs and fourteen modification programs. Each of these groups are
further divided into five commodities:
• Tactical Missiles
• Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence (C3I)
• Helicopters
• Precision Guided Munitions (PGM)
• Vehicles
This research determines schedule and cost variation for the selected Army
Acquisition Programs as reported by the program SARs and the CTAT database. This
research also explores whether a relationship exists between program cycle time and cost
variation. Understanding the relationship between cycle time and cost will provide insight
for future acquisition cycle time and cost reform initiatives. This research will also add to
the effort to increase the accuracy of cost estimation due to schedule changes.
E. METHODOLOGY
The first objective of this research is to familiarize the reader with the DoD
Acquisition Process and SAR information. Next, the importance of cycle time and cost
variation in the acquisition process is explored. Then, information is presented on program
cycle time and cost variation. A literature review of the following sources is conducted:
• Published academic research papers, magazine articles, and books
• DoD publications and regulations (5000 & 7000 series)
• Internet websites
• Interviews with experts on the topic of cost growth
Once a framework is provided for understanding the importance of this analysis,
Army Acquisition Program SAR data is evaluated and organized in tabular form as shown
in Appendices A, B, D, and E. SAR data from the 35 Army Acquisition Programs is
initially analyzed using descriptive statistics to determine the cycle time and cost variation.
Next, regression analysis is conducted to determine if a relationship exists between cycle
time variation and cost variation. This data is also presented in tabular and graphical
formats.
F. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II (Background) provides an overview of the current DoD Acquisition
Process to include an understanding of SARs. This chapter also includes a section that
explains why cycle time and cost variation analysis is important to DoD system acquisition
management.
Chapter HI (Cycle Time and Cost Variation) defines program cycle time and cost
variation, and discusses the methodologies used to analyze the cycle time and cost data.
This chapter concludes with a discussion of the advantages and the difficulties associated
with using SAR data to analyze cycle time and cost variation.
Chapter IV (Cycle Time and Cost Variation Analysis) provides an analysis of
schedule and cost variation. Descriptive statistics are used to compare and contrast cycle
time and cost variation between and within the two major Army Acquisition Program
groups: full acquisition cycle programs and modification programs. This analysis identifies
the phases in the acquisition process where the greatest variation occurs, which program
commodity experiences the greatest variations, and determines the average program length
for the selected Army acquisition programs.
Chapter V (Cycle Time and Cost Variation Correlation) provides a regression
analysis of the relationship between program cycle time, schedule induced cost variation,
and overall program cost variation. The analysis of this data will assist acquisition
workforce personnel to more accurately estimate cost variation due to schedule changes.
Chapter VI (Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendation) summarizes the finding
of the analysis, presents conclusions based on the research results, and identifies
recommended topics for further research efforts.
G. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY
This research will benefit all acquisition workforce personnel to include DoD policy
makers, program management personnel, and operational users. This research helps identify
which phases of the acquisition process and which program commodities have the greatest
schedule and cost variation. This analysis also compares and contrasts variation between
different Army programs (full acquisition cycle vs. modifications), between Army program
commodities, and between phases of the acquisition process. The primary benefit of this
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research is to determine if a relationship exists between cycle time variation, schedule
induced cost variation, and overall program cost variation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of the current DoD Acquisition Process. This
overview includes an understanding of the requirements generation process, acquisition
milestones and phases, and an explanation of acquisition categories. This chapter also
includes a section that discusses SARs, and explains why cycle time and cost variation
analysis is important to DoD system acquisition management.
B. OVERVIEW OF DOD ACQUISITION PROCESS
This section provides information on three systems of the DoD Acquisition
Process: the requirements generation process; acquisition management milestones / phases;
and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). These three systems must
be integrated to ensure decision-makers have the necessary information to make accurate
decisions. This section also discusses the program acquisition categories. An understanding
of each of these acquisition elements is important in order to understand the data analysis
presented in Chapters rv and V. The information in these later chapters is presented in a
manner that assumes the reader has a basic understanding of the ideas and terms discussed
in this section.
1. Requirements Generation Process
The Defense Acquisition Process actually begins with the development of the
National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS is formulated by the National Command
Authority (NCA), the President and Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council
(NSC). This strategy must account for the use of military force from humanitarian
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Figure 1 : DoD Requirement Generation Process
The NSS leads to the development of the National Military Strategy (NMS). The
NMS facilitates regional mission development by the various commands. Mission Area
Assessment (MAA) is conducted to determine if the capabilities exist to accomplish the
necessary missions identified by the NMS. The MAA provides analysis that ascertains the
availability, suitability, and effectiveness of current systems. Mission deficiencies are
identified and provide the basis for development of the Mission Need Statement (MNS).
"The MNS is the major step in the Defense Requirements Process before the Acquisition
Process for new systems begins" (Przemieniecki, 1993, p. 10).
2. Acquisition Management Milestones / Phases
The DoD Acquisition Process consists of four phases and four decision points called
milestones as shown in the following diagram (Mathews, 1998).
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a.
Figure 2: DoD Acquisition Process
Milestone 1 Phase
Milestone is the approval to conduct concept studies. Upon validation of a
mission need for a new program, a MS Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is convened to
identify possible non-material alternatives, material alternatives, and approve concept
studies if required. At the conclusion of the MS DAB, an Acquisition Decision
Memorandum (ADM) is prepared. The MS ADM identifies the minimum set of
alternative concepts to be researched, identifies the lead organization for the research,
establishes Phase exit criteria, and identifies the funding amount and source for the
research. (Mathews, 1998) MS approval does not initiate a new program. This approval
only provides authority to begin Phase (DoD Directive 5000.2R).
Phase of the acquisition process is called Concept Exploration (CE).
During this phase, the lead agency finalizes the MNS that drives the alternative concept
research. This phase consists of exploring the identified number of alternative concepts in
terms of cost, schedule, and performance objectives. (Mathews, 1998) These objectives are
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incorporated into an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB). Acquisition Strategies are
developed for each promising concept, an initial Operational Requirements Document
(ORD) is prepared, and Phase I exit criteria are defined (DoD Directive 5000.2R).
b. Milestone I 1 Phase I
Milestone I is the approval to begin a new acquisition program. The
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) must approve the acquisition strategy, the APB, and
the Phase I exit criteria. The previous three concepts are incorporated into the MS I ADM.
Also testing personnel on the DAB will review and approve the Test and Evaluation Master
Plan (TEMP). Upon approval ofMS I, a Program Management Office (PMO) is established
to manage the new program. (DoD Directive 5000.2R)
Phase I of the acquisition process is called Program Definition and Risk
Reduction (PDRR). During this acquisition phase, the newly initiated program is defined by
the promising concepts in terms of design approaches and required technologies. The use of
prototyping and early operational assessments are used to reduce program risk and evaluate
critical technologies and processes (DoD Directive 5000.2R). The objective of PDRR is to
understand the technology, manufacturing, and support risks of the program. The Program
Manager (PM) must identify and evaluate possible tradeoffs between cost, schedule, and
performance objectives in the APB (Mathews, 1998). As in Concept Exploration, exit
criteria for Phase II must be established prior to MS n.
c. Milestone II / Phase II
Milestone II is the approval to enter Phase II. The objective of the Milestone
II decision is to determine if the analysis conducted in PDRR supports a continuation of the
program. During this milestone review, the MDA must approve the updated acquisition
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strategy, the updated APB (development baseline), and the identified Phase II exit criteria.
As with the two previous milestone decisions, an ADM provides written evidence of the
MDA's approval.
Phase II of the acquisition process is called Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD). The best concept alternative is transformed into a cost-effective,
stable design. Developmental Testing (DT) is conducted to ensure system capabilities
satisfy performance requirements. Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) occurs in order to
produce a small number of systems. The LRIP systems validate the production process and
are utilized in Operational Testing (OT) later in the phase. (DoD Directive 5000.2R)
d. Milestone III / Phase III
Milestone HI is approval to enter acquisition Phase HL During this
milestone review, the MDA will approve the updated acquisition strategy, the updated APB
(production baseline), and the Phase HI exit criteria as needed.
Phase III of the acquisition process is called Production, Fielding /
Deployment, and Operational Support. The objective of this phase is to achieve production
capability resulting in a system operational capability that meets mission suitability and
effectiveness requirements (DoD Directive 5000.2R). During this phase, a system will
reach Initial Operational Capability. IOC is the first capability to effectively employ a
weapon system or piece of equipment. Effectively employ means the weapon system is
operated by a trained and equipped military unit. An IOC date is usually established early in
the program based on mission threat (Sammet & Green, 1990, p.436).
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3. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
The third important aspect of the Defense Acquisition System is the PPBS process.
The PPBS is a management process that develops the DoD portion of the Executive Budget
that is submitted to Congress. The PPBS is a cyclic, calendar-driven process that the DoD
personnel utilize to develop its yearly budget. (Schmoll, 1996)
Besides preparing the annual budget, the PPBS is also used to adjust the Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP), which includes DoD requirements for the five years after
the next budget year. The PPBS is broken up into three separate sections; Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting. The planning phase begins in the fall and ends with the
development of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). (Schmoll, 1996)
The programming phase is the connection between the planning phase and the
detailed price estimate of each program required in the budget phase. Service and Defense
agencies use the DPG to develop their own Program Objective Memoranda (POM). The
POM is a request by these agencies to receive the required resources to accomplish their
missions. (Schmoll, 1996)
The budgeting phase is controlled by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) (ASD(C)). In this phase, the Service and Defense agency POMs are reviewed
and Budget Estimate Submissions (BES) are prepared. The BESs are sent by the Service
and Defense agencies to the OSD and then to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). The BESs are included in the Executive Budget request that is submitted to
Congress. (Schmoll, 1996)
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4. Acquisition Program Categories
After approval to initiate a new acquisition program, that program is assigned as one
of the following Acquisition Categories (ACATs):
a. ACAT I Programs
Programs assigned to this category are also called Major^Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). A program must meet at least one of the following
prerequisites to be designated as an ACAT I program. The estimated RDT&E cost must
exceed $355 Million (FY 96 dollars) or the estimated procurement cost must exceed $2,135
Billion (FY 96 dollars). If a program does not meet either of these criteria, it can still be
designated an ACAT I program by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology) (USD(A&T)) (DoD Directive 5000.2R). The ACAT I programs are further
divided into ACAT ID and ACAT IC programs. The MDA for ACAT ID programs is the
USD(A&T), and the MDA for ACAT IC programs is the DoD Component Head.
b. ACAT IA Programs
Programs assigned to this category are also called Major Automated
Information Systems (MAIS). A Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence
(C3I) program must meet at least one of the following prerequisites to be designated as an
ACAT IA program. The estimated program single-year cost must exceed $30 Million (FY
96 dollars). The estimated total program costs must exceed $120 Million (FY 96 dollars) or
the estimated program total Life-Cycle Cost (LCC) must exceed $360 Million (FY 96
dollars). If a program does not meet any of these criteria, it can still be designated an ACAT
IA program by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) (ASD (C3I)) (DoD Directive
5000.2R). As with the ACAT I programs, the ACAT IA programs are also divided into two
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categories, ACAT IAM and ACAT IAC. The MDA for the ACAT IAM programs is the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Chief Information Officer (CIO). The MDA for
the ACAT IAC programs is the DoD Component CIO.
c. ACAT II andACAT III Programs
Programs can also be designated as ACAT II or ACATm categories. A
program is designated ACAT II if the program is a major system, but it does not meet the
requirements for designation as an ACAT I program. A major system is defined as a
"combination of elements that shall function together to produce the capabilities required to
fulfill a mission need to include hardware, equipment, software, or any combination thereof,
but excluding construction or other improvements of real property (DoD Directive 5000.2R,
1.3.3)." An ACAT II program also requires a total cost of $135 Million RDT&E funds (FY
96 dollars) or more than $640 Million Procurement funds (FY 96 dollars).
ACAT HI programs are any programs that do not meet the requirements for
designation as any of the previously described categories. The Component Acquisition
Executive (CAE) designates the MDA to the lowest appropriate level. Further information
on these acquisition categories can be found in DoD Directive 5000.2.
C. SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORTS
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) are one of the two sources of data for the
analysis conducted in this research. " The depictions of cost, schedule, and program
performance contained in the SAR provide the most consistent, official track of program
management available. The SAR is the logical source of data for calculating cost growth on
major procurements (Hough, 1992, p.9)."
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SARs were initially used as a tool to internally manage acquisition programs
beginning in 1969. In 1975, Public Law 94-106 mandated that SARs be submitted to
Congress for all ACAT I or ACAT LA programs (Hough, 1992). As explained in the
acquisition category section, the Secretary of Defense can designate a non-MDAP for SAR
submittal (DoD 7000.3-G).
A Selected Acquisition Report is a yearly, standardized report that summarizes a
MDAP's cost, schedule, and performance data for that year. The program office personnel
prepare the SAR for their program and then forward the SAR to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) for submission to Congress. Congress uses SARs to supervise the
progress of MDAPs. These reports provide early warning of possible cost or schedule
problems that could concern Congress.
A SAR contains 19 sections and instructions on the proper method to input data for
each section. Instruction for preparing SARs is contained in DoD 7000.3-G. The sections
most pertinent to this research are Section 9 - Schedule, Section 1 1 - Program Acquisition
Cost, and Section 13 - Cost Variance Analysis. The schedule section contains development
and current estimates for essential points in the program to include Milestones - HI.
Section 1 1 contains program cost data development estimates and current estimates in base-
year and then-year dollars. This section also contains information concerning system
quantities.
Section 13 provides cost variance information in both current and base-year dollars.









The schedule and quantity category variances and SAR Sections 1 1 and 13 are discussed in
more detail in the methodology explanations later in this research. Benefits and limitations
of using SAR data for schedule and cost variance analysis are discussed in the next chapter.
D. IMPORTANCE OF CYCLE TIME AND COST REDUCTION
At this time, many circumstances are converging which are increasing the
importance of program cycle time and cost variation research. The three main
circumstances are the change in threat environment, decreasing defense budget, and the
need to modernize existing weapon systems. These circumstances require the DoD to
field new systems quickly and upgrade existing equipment within the constraints of a
significantly reduced defense budget. Understanding acquisition program cycle time and
cost variation, and the relationship between these two important program elements could
provide a partial solution to the challenges presented by these convergent conditions.
1. Change in Threat Environment
The current DoD Acquisition Process is structured to solve technical problems
based on a stable, known threat. During the era of the Soviet threat, the acquisition of
new systems was driven by performance goals. Cost and schedule were dependent
variables and were adjusted to ensure that the performance objectives were met or
exceeded .(Kaminski, 1997) Cost and schedule considerations were not as important as
the exceptional performance required to counter the Soviet Union's military capabilities.
The acquisition process operated within an action-reaction system. The U.S. relied on
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intelligence assets to ascertain the attributes that the new Soviet systems would possess
and to determine a relatively accurate appraisal of when the new system would be
fielded. (Kaminski, 1995)
With this intelligence information, the acquisition requirements generation
process could determine exactly what performance characteristics our new military
systems required and when these systems needed to be operationally fielded. This
afforded the acquisition process with a long lead-time to develop the required systems.
Also, with the threat of the Soviet Union, the American public was not as concerned with
the cost of these systems. As Dr. Kaminski (1995) stated, "In the tradeoffs that were
made in those times, performance was the sine qua non of every major defense
acquisition program. Cost [and schedule] were a fall out ~ dependent variables (p.2)."
However, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States no longer faces a
single threat like the former Soviet Union. Since Operation Desert Storm, the U.S.
Armed Forces have participated in over 40 contingency operations, worldwide. The
future battlefield has become fluid and complex, focusing on peacekeeping operations
like Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, and Kosovo. (Shalikashvili, 1996) Macgregor (1997) states
that a revolution in military affairs (RMA) has occurred in this post-Cold War era. RMA
alludes to the fact that there has been a great increase in the ability to combine precision
strike capabilities with the worldwide growth of information technology.
As mentioned above, the culmination of the Cold War did not bring world peace
as people had hoped, in fact, threats to the U.S. have only changed (Perry, 1996). As the
former CJCS, General Shalikashvili, states "since the fall of the Berlin Wall expect the
unexpected' has become the watch-word for the American Armed Forces (p. 165)."
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Today's United States military forces must be able to quickly react to various and
increasingly complex threats. Sanders (1997) states, "in statistical terms, the mean value
of our single greatest threat is considerably reduced, however, the variance of the
collective threat has increased" (p.l).
Regional confusion, ethnic conflict, and war will probably continue to grow over
the next 20 years. American Forces will be called upon to diffuse threats from terrorists,
rogue nations, or from leaders of countries who oppress their citizens (Shalikashvili,
1996). International terrorist attacks against American citizens and property have
increased yearly by 5% from 25% in 1996 to 35% in 1998. As stated above, this trend is
likely to continue (Tenet, 1999).
The average cycle time for DoD Acquisition Programs, program initiation to IOC,
is estimated to be 9 to 1 1 years (White Paper, 1997, p.l). These cycle times, while
arguably adequate during the Cold War, are no longer acceptable. The commercial sector
is developing technological innovations at a much faster pace. Comparable commercial
equipment has a cycle time of 3 to 4 years and the commercial computer sector's
technology cycle is between 12 to 18 months (Kaminski, 1997).
One example of a lengthy acquisition cycle problem is the Air Force F-22 Raptor.
The decision to develop the F-22 was based on a threat and a Mission Need Statement
over a decade old. The aircraft incorporates computer technology at the 386-processor
level. This technology is already many levels of magnitude less efficient and effective
than computer technology available today at commercial stores. (White Paper, 1997)
Another example is the continuing acquisition of the RAH-66, Comanche
Helicopter. The RAH-66 's first SAR was in 1985 and the initial planning for the
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Comanche was initiated in the early 1980s. The Comanche was originally developed to
fight against the Soviet Union. Now 14 years later, the Comanche is still not in
production and the threat has dramatically changed.
United States lawmakers have reacted to the reduced threat of the Soviet Union
by decreasing both the DoD budget and force structure. Scarborough (1998) has
characterized this defense budget decline as the "peace dividend" (p.8). The budget and
force structure has been adjusted to reflect this new environment. If the defense budget
decrease is the correct course of action is questionable based on the increasingly
widespread conflicts (Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo); however, this debate is beyond the
scope of this research.
What is not debatable is the necessity for the DoD Acquisition Process to adjust to
the requirements of this new security environment discussed in this section. This new
security environment does not afford the luxury to gather detailed intelligence
information and then field the newly required system a decade later. "The lives of our
soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airman will increasingly depend upon shortened
acquisition cycle time. In a global market, everyone, including our adversaries, will gain
increasing access to the same commercial technologies base (Kaminski, 1997, p.2)". In
today's world, new systems must be fielded to the operational user quickly in a cost-
effective manner.
2. DoD Budget Decrease
Right now DoD's biggest challenge is finding the resources to both keep
today's forces ready to fight, while at the same time investing now in future
technologies. Our defense budget has been reduced by 40% and it will
remain flat for the foreseeable future (Cohen, 1998, p.2).
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Over the last 14 years, from 1985 to 1999, the defense budget has steadily
decreased. The defense budget has declined from a high of $418.4 billion in 1985 to the
current level of $257.3 billion, a 38.5% decrease. The Army defense budget has declined
from $108.2 billion to $64.3 billion, a 40.6% decrease.
The decrease in the defense budget is a deliberate strategy to capitalize on
winning the Cold War. The billions of dollars cut from the defense budget are used to
increase other Government spending and reduce the budget deficit. Government
lawmakers are operating in a "zero-sum" environment. The only way to increase one
budget account is to decrease another account by the same amount. With the threat of the
Soviet Union streaming through the Fulda Gap extremely unlikely, public opinion favors
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Figure 3: Defense Total Budget Authority
Accounts within the defense budget have also declined sharply. The two most
important defense budget accounts for acquisition management are the RDT&E and
Procurement accounts. These two accounts are usually called modernization accounts.
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Respectively, these two accounts are necessary to conduct research, development, and
testing of new acquisition systems and to procure them.
The RDT&E account supports exploratory development and research of new
technologies with military potential. Acquisition personnel spend RDT&E dollars on a
system's development, testing, and prototypes. The Procurement account supports the
production of systems and their components. Procurement dollars are spent on initial
spares, and modernization and upgrades of existing systems (Berner, 1993).
During this same 14-year period, the RDT&E account has decreased from $45.1
billion or 10.8% of the overall defense budget to $36.1 billion or 14.0% of the defense
budget. The Army RDT&E account has decreased from $6.3 billion to $4.8 billion





ver-^oooN© — r* r*> it m
OO 90 OO 3C Ci ©» O* ^- C- C*






Figure 4: Defense RDT&E Budget Authority
The Procurement account has decreased from $136.4 billion or 32.6% of the
overall defense budget to $48.7 billion or 18.9%. The Army Procurement account has
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decreased from $25.5 billion or 23.5% of the Army defense budget to $9 billion or 13.9%




Figure 5: Defense Procurement Budget Authority
The decrease in the RDT&E and Procurement accounts is a deliberate plan within
the DoD. The DoD decided to make current readiness the priority. Defense Secretary
Perry pledged "to make readiness the first priority, even at the expense of other important
uses for the department's resources" (Morrison, 1995, p. 1218). Current readiness
includes the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) account and the Personnel account.
Representative Saxby Chambliss states that, "the looming defense budget problem is a
train wreck waiting to happen. There's no answer yet. One answer is to put more money
in it. . . I don't know where it is going to come from but we have simply got to put more
money into defense (Schneider, 1999, p.2)."
The majority of the currently proposed defense budget increases, $12 billion for
the Fiscal Year 2000 budget, are targeted at immediate needs; pay raises, service member
benefits, and readiness (Crock, 1999). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),
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General Shelton, stated that "The President's spending increases will halt the readiness
decline but will not help much with modernization" (Mann, 1999, p.426).
3. Need for Modernization
During the force structure decline, the military was able to delay buying new
equipment because existing equipment could be transferred from deactivated units and
reallocated to other units. This luxury is complete and the daunting task of modernization
must be faced (Shalikashvili, 1996). Pillar 3 of Secretary of Defense Cohen's (1998) new
Defense Strategy is "Prepare now for an uncertain future (p.2)." A major goal of this pillar
is to maintain a modernization effort to develop new technologically advanced systems and
replace existing aging systems. The 1998 Army Modernization Plan has five goals to
complete over the next decade. Two of these goals will entail the need for increased
RDT&E and Procurement funding. These goals are to "sustain essential research and
development and focus technology on Leap-Ahead technology for the Army After Next",
and to "recapitalize the existing force (Army Modernization Plan, 1998, p.7)."
The increasing need for military equipment modernization is beginning to receive
further recognition. President Clinton has addressed the need for modernization in both the
1997 and 1999 State of the Union Addresses (p.295 & p.230). Marine Corps Commandant
General Krulak (1999) stated that, "the modernization shortfall is a 'cancer' (Mann, p.427)."
The last Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recognized that a detailed procurement plan is
needed to ensure the U.S. military could modernize its equipment. This plan endorsed the
need to increase Procurement funding to develop new systems and upgrade existing
systems. The JCS have stated that the Procurement account needs to increase to a minimum
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and sustainable level of $60 Billion / year in order to meet requirements set in the NMS
(Fulghum, 1999).
Since 1996, the Procurement account has increased by $4.3 Billion to a level of
$48.7 Billion, in 1999. The Procurement account is projected to reach $53 Billion next year
and $62 Billion in 2001 (Fulghum, 1999). The General Accounting Office (GAO) is
skeptical that these future Procurement increases can be achieved. DoD's modernization
plan must overcome two long-lasting defense budget trends. First, since 1965, O&M
spending has increased at a comparable rate with the Procurement account. The DoD's
modernization plan includes increasing the Procurement account, between 1998 - 2003,
while decreasing the O&M account (GAO, 1997). From 1998 to 1999, the O&M account
has decreased by $2 Billion while the Procurement account has increased by $3 Billion.
However, DoD's ability to maintain this type of relationship for the next 4 years is unclear.
The second defense budget trend is that the Procurement account has mirrored the
overall Defense account, since 1965. In order for the modernization plan to succeed, the
Procurement account must increase by 43% while the defense budget remains flat (GAO,
1997). From 1998 to 1999, the defense budget has decreased by $3 Billion while the
Procurement account has increase by $3 Billion. Again, the DoD's ability to maintain this
successful relationship for the next 4 years is questionable.
As General Shalikashvili (1995) stated, "Modernization is tomorrow's readiness
(Morrison, p. 1218)." In order for tomorrow's service members to accomplish their missions,
future readiness must be achieved. The equipment and systems currently used by DoD
soldiers are nearing the end of their expected lifetime. Active duty soldiers are flying 35-
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year-old bombers and air-lifters, 25-year-old fighters, 40-year-old assault helicopters, and
driving 35-year-old trucks. (Morrison, 1995)
These systems will soon need to be replaced with upgraded systems incorporating
the newest technology. The military must be able to develop, produce, and field these new
systems within the constraints of the reduced defense budget and at an accelerated cycle
time required to adapt to the already described ever-changing threat environment.
E. SUMMARY
Chapter II provides a background on the DoD Acquisition Process. The
requirements generation process, the acquisition process, the PPBS, and the acquisition
categories are discussed in adequate detail to facilitate an understanding of the analysis in
Chapter IV and Chapter V. Additional information on these acquisition aspects can be
obtained from DoD Directive 5000.2R. SAR information is also provided to familiarize the
reader with the primary source of the research data.
This chapter concludes with an explanation of why this research is important in
today's changing acquisition environment. Program cycle time and cost variation analysis
can provide a partial solution to deal with these three convergent conditions; the new
security environment, the decline of the defense budget, and the need for modernization.
The Acquisition Process must adjust to the new environment these identified conditions
have created. Today's acquisition environment requires the ability to quickly react to
numerous, ever-changing, worldwide threats. The Acquisition Process must be able to
quickly field systems, within the constraints of the reduced defense budget, before the
technology becomes outdated or the threat changes.
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in. CYCLE TIME AND COST VARIATION
Program cost increases and schedule delays are two of the oldest, most
prevalent, and most visible problems associated with weapon systems
development and procurement (GAO, 1997, p. 14).
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides information on the methodologies used to analyze the cycle
time and cost data collected for this acquisition program cycle time and cost research.
Knowledge of these methodologies will facilitate an understanding of the analysis presented
in Chapter IV of this thesis. This chapter also presents a discussion of the benefits and
disadvantages of using SAR information for this type of research. Understanding these
benefits and disadvantages is important for a complete understanding of the analysis portion
of this research document.
In order to understand the methodologies discussed in this chapter and the analysis
presented in the next two chapters, three terms must be clearly defined.
• Program - This term refers to a specific effort to provide a new or improved
capability that is funded by RDT&E and Procurement appropriations.
• Commodity - Each of the programs in this study are placed into one of five
program areas (Tactical missiles, C3I, Helicopters, PGM, and Vehicles). The
individual programs are placed in these commodities based on program
characteristics, as specified in the CTAT database.
• Group - This term refers to how the programs are sorted for this research. The
35 Army programs are divided into two groups; the full acquisition cycle group
and the modification group.
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B. CYCLE TIME VARIATION
This section of Chapter EI identifies and discusses the source of the cycle time data
for the identified Army programs. It also explains the methodology used to analyze the
cycle time data as presented in Section B of Chapter IV.
1. Source of Cycle Time Data
The cycle time data used in this research is extracted from the DoD Cycle Time
Analysis Tool (CTAT) database. CTAT was developed by TASC, Inc. to provide a tool that
facilitates access and portraits DoD acquisition program schedule data. CTAT integrates
DoD MDAP and MAIS schedule data from SARs and APBs, and displays this data in terms
of the major milestones described in Chapter EL The CTAT includes all DoD programs that
have submitted SARs since 1969. This tool facilitates cycle time data analysis by numerous
variables. Data can be analyzed and displayed by service, program start year, system
category, milestone decision point, and many others. A statistical package can also be
added to the CTAT to generate a more detailed statistical analysis of these categories. A
complete description of the CTAT can be found in the DoD CTAT User's Guide. A CTAT
User's Guide and information about the CTAT can be acquired from the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.
Instead of using the statistical analysis provided by CTAT, this research extracts the
required cycle time data from the raw database. This approach is followed to facilitate
merging this cycle time data with cost data extracted directly from the SARs. CTAT
provides the means to export the entire database to Microsoft Excel as an Excel spreadsheet.
This all-encompassing spreadsheet was initially modified to include only Army programs.
Then the Army programs are split into two groups: full acquisition programs and
30
modification programs. These two groups are further modified to only include programs
that incorporated a full acquisition cycle. This means that programs are included in the full
acquisition program group only if the program incorporates or plans to incorporate MS I,
MS H, MS m, and IOC.
Lastly, this spreadsheet is modified to portrait the selected programs by the five
program commodities as shown in Table 1. These modified spreadsheets are shown in
Appendix A of this research paper. There are two spreadsheets included in Appendix A.
One spreadsheet shows the cycle time data by commodity and by actual milestone date. The
second spreadsheet shows the same data; however, instead of milestone date the cycle time
data has been converted to months. Table 1 lists the 21 programs included in the full
acquisition cycle group by program commodity. For these programs, the current cycle time
estimate in the last program SAR is used in this analysis.
Table 1. Program Commodity: Full Acquisition Programs
Tactical Missiles C3I Helicopters PGM Vehicles
Javelin AFATDS AH-64A ATACMS-BAT Crusader
Hellfire AN/TTC-39 RAH-66 #1 Copperhead Ml Abrams
ATACMS/APAM BL I SCAMP RAH-66#2 SADARM Bradley
Lance SMART-T UH-60A PLS(FHTV)
Longbow Hellfire Longbow Apache
There are two RAH-66 entries because this program was rebaselined in 1990. RAH-66 #1
contains program data from years 1985 - 1990 and RAH-66 #2 contains program data from
years 1992 - 1997. Table 2 lists the 14 programs included in the modification group, again
by program commodity.
31
Table 2. Program Commodity: Modifications
Tactical Missiles C3I Helicopters PGM Vehicles
AGM-114 ASAS CH-47D BAT P3I BFVS/A3 Upgrade










2. Cycle Time Analysis Methodology
The cycle time data is analyzed to determine cycle time growth, cycle time
percentage growth, and program length. The results of the analysis are presented in Section
B of Chapter IV. In order to help explain the cycle time methodology, the data for the
Single Channel Anti-Jam Man-Portable (SCAMP) program is used to demonstrate the
calculations for each of the three metrics.
Table 3. Cycle Time Data for SCAMP
Program PrgmStart - IOC MSI-MSn ms n - ms in ms in - ioc
Months Months Months Months
SCAMP 72 5 45 22
SCAMP 72 5 45 22
SCAMP 72 5 30 37
Each of the above lines represents data from a yearly SAR for the SCAMP program.
A program's first year SAR data is the base-year for the cycle time analysis. Also, a
program's last submitted SAR data is the current estimate. For this analysis, the word
"growth" expresses variance. Positive growth means that cycle time increases and a
negative growth means cycle time decreases. All of the calculations in this analysis are in
months.
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a. Cycle Time Growth
Calculating the cycle time growth is a process of subtracting the base-year
cycle time estimate from the current estimate. For the SCAMP program's overall (MS I -
IOC) cycle time growth, the following calculation is computed:
Current Estimate - Base Year Estimate = Cycle Time Growth
72 72
This calculation is computed for each of the phases (MS I - MS n, MS II - MS HI, and MS
HI- IOC). For this program, the overall cycle time growth is because the negative growth
from MS II - MS m (-15) and the positive growth from MS HI - IOC (15) cancels each
other.
b. Cycle Time Percentage Growth
The cycle time percentage growth is calculated using the cycle time growth
calculation, shown previously, and then dividing the cycle time growth by the base-year
estimate. The calculation for the SCAMP' s percentage growth from MS HI - IOC is shown
below:
Current Estimate - Base Year Estimate = Cycle Time Growth
37 - 22 15
Then, the cycle time growth is divided by the base-year estimate to arrive at the cycle time
percentage growth as shown:
(Cycle time growth / Base-Year Estimate) * 100%
15 / 22 * 100%
The SCAMP'S percentage growth from MS HI - IOC is 68.18%.
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The cycle time percentage growth metric is calculated because it is important
to understand the degree by which a program varies from the baseline cycle time estimate.
However, the cycle time percentage growth metric can be misleading. If a phase (MS I -
MS H) has a small base-year estimate (2) and a small cycle time growth (2), then the cycle
time percentage growth is 100%. On the other hand, if a phase has a large base-year
estimate (20) and a small cycle time growth (2), then the cycle time percentage growth is
now only 10%. These programs have a difference of 90% in percentage growth, even
though each program experienced the same cycle time growth in months. Appendix A of
this report includes the raw data in Excel tables used to calculate this metric.
c. Program Length
The program length (MS I or MS II to IOC) is the actual months
required or months estimated to meet IOC, as reported in the final or last submitted SAR.
This means actual program length is the length of the original program estimate plus any
subsequent growth from that estimate (Drezner, 1990). If a program has not reached IOC as
of the last submitted SAR, then the current estimate in the last submitted SAR is used for
program length.
C. COST VARIATION
This section of Chapter DI discusses the source of the cost data for the identified
Army programs. It also explains the methodology used to analyze the data presented in
Section C of Chapter IV. The methodology is based on the Institute for Defense Analysis
(IDA) and RAND cost methodologies. These methodologies are presented in the IDA
Paper P-2722, The Effects ofManagement Initiatives on the Costs and Schedules ofDefense
Acquisition Programs, and the RAND paper, An Analysis ofWeapon System Cost Growth.
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The most significant difference is the method of adjusting for quantity changes within a
program's acquisition cycle. This research in this document uses the quantity cost variances
as reported by the program office personnel in each program SAR. Both IDA and RAND
use internal methods to calculate their own cost numbers based on quantity change. Each
uses a method based on cost quantity curves.
The research conducted in this document, IDA, and RAND analyze each SAR to
ensure that affects of program baseline changes and arbitrary changes are adjusted for in the
current estimate. Exactly what adjustments are made to the cost numbers are not explained
in minute detail in the EDA and RAND reports due to the number of programs included in
their research. However, a detailed description of cost adjustments is provided in Appendix
D of this document. Appendix D provides enough detail to recalculate each cost growth
factor. Further research can use Appendix D to recreate the cost growth factors in this
document or adjust these numbers based on different assumptions or research objectives.
Table 9 in Chapter V provides a comparison between cost growth factors for programs
common to all three research efforts.
1. Source of Cost Data
The data source for the selected Army programs is the individual program SARs.
For the 34 identified programs, 296 individual yearly SARs are analyzed. For the cost
analysis, there are only 34 programs because the RAH-66 is analyzed as a whole program.
This is also the case in the Chapter V analysis. The required cost data is extracted from
SAR sections 1 1 and 13.
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a. SAR Section 11
SAR Section 1 1 is called "Program Acquisition Cost". This section
addresses a program's total cost separated into Development (DEV), Procurement (PROC),
and Construction costs. More recent SARs change the Development (DEV) cost to RDT&E
cost. Throughout the rest of this document, these two terms are interchangeable when
referring to costs. However, Development (DEV) cost must not be confused with
Development Estimate (DE). These dollar amounts are provided in base-year dollars and
escalated to then-year dollars. For each of these costs, there is an initial program estimate
and a current estimate (CE). The initial program estimate can either be a planning estimate
(PE) or a development estimate (DE).
The PE is estimated at the time of program initiation approval (MS I). This
estimate accounts for the operational characteristics, technical characteristics, schedule, and
acquisition costs. The PE will be utilized until the DE becomes the program baseline. The
DE is estimated at the time of Full Scale Development (FSD), MS II, and should also
account for the same factors as the PE. Once either of these estimates is established, only
the approval of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Comptroller (ASD(C)) can change the
established baseline. (DoD 7000.3-G)
As mentioned above, SAR Section 1 1 also includes a CE in base-year and
then-year dollars. The CE is the most recent cost forecast for a program's operational and
technical characteristics, the program schedule, and the program acquisition cost required to
procure the approved program quantities (DoD 7000.3-G). The initial estimate (PE or DE)
can then be compared to the CE to determine the amount of program cost growth. This is
further explained in the cost growth methodology section of this chapter. SAR Section 1
1
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contains additional information such as program quantity, unit cost, design-to-cost goals,
foreign military sales data, and nuclear cost as applicable. These information categories are
not discussed because they are not pertinent to this research.
b. SAR Section 13
SAR Section 13 is called "Cost Variance Analysis". This section contains
cost information concerning any cost variances between the initial cost estimate (PE or DE)
and the current estimate. The cost variances are separated into the seven categories as
presented in Chapter II. Prior to approximately 1982, the cost information in this section
contained only the base-year cost variance with a column that showed escalation costs for
each variance category. After approximately 1982, the format changed and the cost
variance is shown in both then-year and base-year dollars.
The cost growth information (base-year or then-year) in this section is
divided into two categories. These categories are Previous cost variances and Current cost
variances. The Previous cost variance category includes the aggregate cost variances from
the first program SAR to the previous reporting period. The Current cost variance category
only includes cost variances incurred during the current SAR reporting period. As an
example, use the yearly 1990 SAR for a program. For this program, the Previous cost
variance would include all cost variances in aggregate from program start (1st SAR) to
1989. The Current cost variance category would include all cost variances for the 1990
reporting period. To obtain the total cost variance for this program, the Previous cost
variance are added to the Current cost variance. This total is shown in the Total Changes
row of SAR Section 13. Only two of the seven cost variance categories are pertinent to this
research: Schedule and Quantity.
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2. Cost Data Analysis Methodology
This section provides the methodology for calculating the cost growth variables used
in the cost analysis in Chapter IV and the regression analysis in Chapter V. Prior to defining
the cost variables, three cost issues need to be discussed. These issues are changing baseline
estimates, adjusting for quantity cost variance, and explaining the use of cost factors instead
of reporting cost growth in dollars.
a. Cost Variance Analysis Issues
The objective of this research is to quantify cost growth from program start
to IOC or last SAR submission, and then determine its relationship to schedule growth. Due
to this objective, the PE and the DE are incorporated in the same sample group. If a
program only has a PE, such as the RAH-66 Comanche, then the PE is used as the cost
baseline. If a program initiates with a PE and then converts to a DE at MS n, such as the
AH-64 Apache, then the DE is used for the cost growth calculations. If a baseline's (PE or
DE) cost changes arbitrarily then the initial baseline continues to be utilized.
Another baseline estimation problem that could occur is when a cost baseline
(PE or DE) is updated to a different constant dollar year, for example, changing from
reporting in constant 82 base-year dollars to constant 89 base-year dollars. In this case, the
constant base-year in the last SAR is used. Error could enter the calculations based on the
program office's inflation calculations. However, this error could be compounded by
attempting to convert the new constant base-year cost amounts and the cost variance
amounts back to the original base-year.
Both the cost analysis and the cycle time growth relationship to cost growth
includes analysis incorporating the total cost growth unadjusted for quantity changes.
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However, these analyses also include cost growth adjusted for quantity changes. In order to
maintain a consistent baseline, all quantity adjustments are normalized to the baseline
quantity. The method for accomplishing this normalization procedure is taken from RAND
cost growth research (Hough, 1992). This procedure uses the reported cost quantity
variance in the cost variance analysis section of the SAR. The quantity cost variance is
subtracted from the total program cost variance to obtain a cost variance adjusted for
quantity. Further explanation of this normalization procedure and an example are provided
in the cost growth variables definitions. Alternate methods (using cost-quantity curves) are
available; however, this method is selected because it is the most straightforward, and
because the quantity cost variance is based on initial estimate cost-quantity curves (DoD
7000.3-G). An explanation of the affects of quantity change is presented in Chapter V.
The third issue is the use of cost growth factors, or cost growth percentages,
instead of the more straightforward cost growth expressed in dollars. Cost growth factors
are used in order to compare cost growths between different programs. As mentioned
previously, program costs are expressed in both then-year and constant base-year dollar
amounts in each SAR. This allows a researcher to calculate the cost growth within a
program without the need for inflation adjustment. However, this does not apply to a cost
growth comparison between different programs because each program usually has a
different constant base-year.
Usually, a program's first SAR year is selected as the constant base-year for
the program. In order to compare a program's cost growth across different constant base-
years, a cost growth factor is calculated which represents a percentage cost growth. The
cost growth factor is defined as the current estimated cost divided by the initial estimated
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cost. A cost growth factor of 1 means that there is no cost growth. A cost growth factor
exceeding 1 means that the program has experienced an increase in program cost, and a cost
growth factor less than 1 means the program has experienced a reduction in program cost.
(Peck, 1962) If a cost growth factor is calculated to be 1. 19, then that program has
experienced a 19% increase in program cost.
b. SAR Cost Data Adjustments
The cost numbers expressed in a program's last SAR can not be extracted
without additional consideration to the program's history. Numerous events could occur
during the life of a program that could affect a program's cost numbers. A program's cost
numbers need to be adjusted for these program changes. The following explanations
provide an overview that describes adjustments made to programs included in this research.
A more detailed presentation of cost adjustments is provided in Appendix D.
The first step that must be completed is ensuring that the cost data in the
final year SAR is correct. The DoD 7000. 3-G SAR guidance states that the Previous
Changes plus the Current Changes in the SAR cost variance section should equal the
Previous Changes in the next year SAR. In other words, the Total Changes amount in the
SAR cost variance section should equal the subtotal in the Previous Changes section ofthe
next year's SAR. "Corrections to Previous Changes will be shown as Current Changes. For
example, if the previous Other Changes of+15 should have been classified as Estimating,
the Current Changes would show -15 for Other and +15 for Estimating (DoD 7000.3-G, p.3-
1)." In some cases, the Total Changes amount in a SAR did not equate to the sum of the
Previous Change amounts and the Current Change amounts. This problem occurred in the
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1983 SAR for the Bradley in which the Total Changes only included the sum of the Current
Changes.
In some of the program SARs, the Total Changes from the previous year
SAR do not equal the Previous Change subtotal in the next year's SAR. Some of the
variance categories seem to be adjusted arbitrarily. In these cases, the change explanations
are analyzed to either allow the adjustment if there is an explanation or to adjust the cost
variance if there is no reasonable explanation. An example of a reasonable explanation
occurs in the RAH-66 Comanche program. There is a discrepancy between the 1989 and
1990 SARs in the schedule variance category. The Previous Changes section of the 1990
SAR includes +145 in the schedule variance that did not appear in either the of the 1989
SAR's Previous Changes or Current Changes sections. The variance explanation shows that
the +145 is added to the schedule variance due to DoD direction to rebaseline the program.
Even though this amount should have been incorporated in the current variance change
section, the explanation makes sense and the cost is not adjusted.
The Ml Abrams program's last SAR is 1991; however, the cost information
for this program is extracted from the 1985 SAR. The 1985 SAR cost data is used because
after 1985 the Ml modifications, M1A1 and M1A2, are combined into the Ml SAR. The
schedule and performance data is separated in the SAR but the cost information is
combined. There is no way to separate the cost data based on the program SARs.
This situation also occurs in the ATACM/BAT program because after 1993 the program
upgrades; P3I, ATACM/BAT Block n, and Block HA, are included in a combined cost.
The AGM-1 16 Hellfire cost data is extracted from the 1991 SAR because the Hellfire
Optimized Missile System (HOMS) Hellfire II is included in the cost data in 1992 and 1993.
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The SADARM program is adjusted to only include the cost data from the
SADARM 155mm projectile. Up to 1995 the program also included cost information for a
MLRS SADARM rocket; however, this part of the program was cancelled in 1995.
The Longbow AH-64 program data does not include the 1996 and 1997
SARs because these SARs contain production estimates. This program data includes both
the fire control system and the necessary airframe modification costs. This program is
included in the C3I commodity because the DoD approved CTAT database classifies this
program as avionics. Since this is the only program with this classification, this program is
included with the C3I commodity for this research.
The Bradley program is adjusted to reflect when the actual Bradley program
started. From 1973 to 1977, this program is the XM-23, Mechanized Infantry Fighting
Vehicle. In 1978, the program incorporates two systems; the XM2, Infantry Fighting
Vehicle and the XM 3, Cavalry Fighting Vehicle. In 1979, the program actually became the
Bradley. The Bradley program cost is adjusted to only incorporate cost associated with the
Bradley. This is accomplished by subtracting the cost amounts in the Previous Change
Section of the 1979 SAR from the final year SAR's Current Estimate. Further explanations
of cost growth factors and an example are presented in the cost variable definition section
that is discussed next.
c. Cost Variable Definitions
This section defines all of the cost growth variables associated with the cost
growth analysis presented in Chapters IV and V. As mentioned previously, the cost growth
numbers used in this analysis are extracted from SAR Sections 1 1 and 13. The initial basis
for these cost growth numbers is a program's final year SAR that is adjusted for errors and
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program changes as explained in the previous section, and in detail in Appendix D. As with
the cycle time data, the cost data is extracted from a programs last SAR. If a program as not
yet reached IOC, then the current cost estimate in the last SAR is used in the analysis.
To facilitate the definition of these cost growth variables, the 1992 SAR cost
data for the AH-64 Apache is used to provide example calculations. These examples use the
unadjusted 1992 SAR cost data for the AH-64A. For this reason, the factors calculated in
this section do not match the AH-64 cost growth factors presented in Appendix B.







RDT&E ($) 609.4 731.3
Procurement ($) 1283.0 3142.1
Construction (MILCON) 32
Ops and Maint (O&M)
Total FY72 Base-Year $ 1892.4 3905.4
Escalation ($) 1897.4 7839.4
Total Then-Year ($) 3789.8 11,744.8









Development Est 609.4 1283.0 0.0 1892.4
Previous Changes
Economic - - - -
Quantity - 541.6 - 541.6
Schedule 94.6 46.2 -4.6 136.2
Engineering 27.6 62.4 - 90.0
Estimating 63.2 818.6 36.6 918.4
Other -80.9 - - -80.9
Support 17.4 391.4 - 408.8
Subtotal 121.9 1860.2 32 2014.1
Current Changes
Economic - - - -
Quantity - - - -
Schedule - - - -
Engineering - - - -
Estimating - - - -
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Other - - - -
Support - -1.1 - -1.1
Subtotal - -1.1 - -1.1
Total Changes 121.9 1859.1 32 2013.0
Current Estimate 731.3 3142.1 32 3905.4
As shown, the dollar amounts in Table 4 correspond to the dollar amounts in
Table 5. Table 5 explains the variance between the development estimate and the current
estimate in terms of the seven cost variance categories. The cost variances are shown in
terms of Development, Procurement, and Construction. The constant base-year dollar
estimate plus the previous cost changes and current cost changes equals the current base-
year dollar estimate. Each SAR also contains a cost variance section like Table 5 that
presents the cost variance in terms of then-year dollars. Each of the following nine cost
variables are explained using the AH-64 Apache cost data as presented above.
• TCGF: Total Cost Growth Factor - The TCGF represents the total cost
percentage growth from the initial estimate (PE or DE) to the current estimate
unadjusted for quantity cost variance. The following is an example of the
formula to calculate TCGF. In this example, the AH-64 program experienced a
total cost growth of 106% not 206%. Need to remember that 100% of the 206%
is due to the initial estimate.
TCGF = Current estimate / Initial (PE or DE) estimate
TCGF = (3905.4 / 1892.4) = 2.06
• DCGF: Development Cost Growth Factor - The DCGF represents the total
RDT&E cost growth from initial estimate (PE or DE) to the current RDT&E
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estimate unadjusted for quantity change. The following is an example of the
formula to calculate DCGF.
DCGF = Current RDT&E estimate / Initial RDT&E estimate
DCGF = 73 1.3/ 609.4 =1.2
PCGF: Procurement Cost Growth Factor - The PCGF represents the total PROC
cost growth from initial PROC estimate (PE or DE) to the current PROC
estimate unadjusted for quantity change. The following is an example of the
formula to calculate PCGF.
PCGF = Current PROC estimate / Initial PROC estimate
PCGF = 3142.1 / 1283.0 = 2.45
TCGFA: Total Cost Growth Factor Adjusted - The TCGFA represents the total
cost growth from initial estimate (PE or DE) to the adjusted current estimate.
The current estimate is adjusted for Quantity cost variance as described
previously. The following is an example of the formula to calculate TCGFA. In
this calculation, the sum of the Previous Quantity cost change and the Current
Quantity cost change is always subtracted from the current estimate. If cost
increases due to a quantity change then the Quantity cost variance should be
subtracted from the current estimate to adjust for quantity. If cost decreases due
to a quantity change then the Quantity cost variance should be added to the
current estimate. In this calculation, if the Previous Quantity cost variance plus
the Current Quantity cost variance amount is negative, then subtracting a
negative number results in the Quantity cost variance being added to the current
estimate.
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TCGFA = (Current Estimate - (Previous Quantity variance + Current
Quantity variance)) / Initial estimate
TCGFA = (3905.4 - (541.6 + 0)) / 1892.4 = 1.78
Comparing TCGFA to TCGF demonstrates the affect that quantity change,
within a program, has on cost growth analysis. Cost growth decreases by 28%
after adjusting for quantity.
• DCGFA: Development Cost Growth Factor Adjusted - The DCGFA represents
the total RDT&E cost growth from initial RDT&E estimate (PE or DE) to the
adjusted current RDT&E estimate. The current RDT&E estimate is adjusted for
Quantity cost variance as described previously. The following is an example of
the formula to calculate DCGFA.
DCGFA = (Current RDT&E estimate- (Previous RDT&E Quantity cost
variance + Current RDT&E Quantity cost variance)) / Initial RDT&E
estimate
DCGFA = (731.3 - (0 + 0)) / 609.4 = 1.20
In this instance there is zero quantity cost variance associated with the RDT&E
estimate so the DCGFA is the same as the DCGF.
• PCGFA: Procurement Cost Growth Factor Adjusted - The PCGFA represents
the PROC cost growth from initial PROC estimate (PE or DE) to the adjusted
current PROC estimate. The current PROC estimate is adjusted for Quantity
cost variance as already described. The following is an example of the formula
to calculate PCGFA.
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PCGFA = (Current PROC estimate - (Previous PROC Quantity cost
variance + Current PROC Quantity cost variance)) / Initial PROC estimate
PCGFA = (3142.1 - (541.6 + 0)) / 1283.0 = 2.03
In this instance, there is a decrease in the Procurement cost growth of42% after
adjusting for quantity changes.
• STCGF: Schedule induced Total Cost Growth Factor - The STCGF is the
amount of program cost growth that is attributed to schedule changes. This
variable is calculated with the following formula.
STCGF = Initial estimate + (Previous Schedule cost variance + Current
Schedule cost variance) / Initial estimate
STCGF = 1892.4 + (136.2 + 0) / 1892.4 = 1.07
• SDCGF: Schedule induced Development Cost Growth Factor - The SDCGF is
the amount ofRDT&E cost growth that is attributed to schedule changes. This
variable is calculated with the following formula.
SDCGF = Initial RDT&E estimate + (Previous RDT&E Schedule cost
variance + Current RDT&E Schedule cost variance) / Initial RDT&E
estimate
SDCGF = 609.4 + (94.6 + 0) / 609.4 =1.16
• SPCGF: Schedule induced Procurement Cost Growth Factor - The SPCGF is the
amount of PROC cost growth that is attributed to schedule changes. This
variable is calculated with the following formula.
SPCGF = Initial PROC estimate + (Previous PROC Schedule cost variance
+ Current PROC Schedule cost variance) / Initial PROC estimate
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SPCGF = 1283.0 + (46.2 + 0) / 1283.0 = 1.04
D. SAR DATA FOR CYCLE TIME AND COST ANALYSIS
There are both benefits and disadvantages when using SARs as the data source for
this type of research. This section of Chapter HI will discuss both the benefits and
disadvantages of the SAR data. Mistakes and misleading conclusions could arise if a
working knowledge of these benefits and disadvantages is not understood.
1. Advantages of Using SAR Data
Four advantages of using SAR data for cycle time and cost variation analysis are
discussed in this section. These advantages are that SARs contain the most cycle time and
cost information in one location, relational databases, SARs are now in electronic format,
and inflation adjustments.
a. Cycle Time and Cost Data
The biggest advantage of using SARs as the data source for cycle time and
cost research is that all ACAT I and ACAT LA programs must submit a SAR to DoD at least
yearly. Each program's SAR should report any significant schedule or cost changes and the
reason for these changes. Section 13 of the SAR portraits cost variation due to schedule
variation. This cost data is expressed in both base-year and current-year dollars. SARs are
one of the few official Government documents that provide relatively consistent and
accurate information on program cost, schedule, and performance data (Drezner, 1993).
b. Relational Databases
Another advantage of using SAR data is that relational databases containing
SAR data are being developed. The CTAT is one example of an interactive database, based
on SAR data, designed to facilitate analysis of program cycle time. The Defense System
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Cost Performance Database, also based on SAR data, was developed by RAND in order to
analyze program cost variation. It is probably only a matter of time before a relational SAR
database is developed that incorporates all three important aspects of a program; cost,
schedule, and performance.
c. Electronic Format
Currentiy all available SARs have been transferred to CD, which gready
increases the access to all SAR data. Prior to the SAR CDs, all paper SARs were on record
in Washington, D.C. In order to access all of the SARs, a researcher had to travel to
Washington and spend a significant amount of time extracting the required data from filed
paper reports. Now a researcher can request the CDs and thus access any program SAR
from their home location. This computer access also greatly decreases the time
requirements for gathering SAR data. A slight drawback is that these CDs are classified as
SECRET. In order to use these SAR CDs, a researcher must have a SECRET clearance and
access to a secure processing facility.
d. Inflation Adjustments
A fourth advantage of SAR data is that post-1974 SARs report cost in both
current and base-year dollars. This allows cost research to be conducted either with or
without the effects of inflation. If a researcher wants to show how cost growth affects the
overall budget then inflation should be taken into account. If a researcher wants to analyze
program cost growth only due to program inputs then inflation should not be incorporated.
(Hough, 1992)
49
2. Disadvantages of Using SAR Data
Four disadvantages of using SAR data for cycle time and cost variation analysis is
discussed in this section. These disadvantages are selecting a baseline, exclusion of some
costs, incomplete database, and inflation adjustments.
a. Baseline Selection
The greatest disadvantage of using SAR data is the selection of a baseline.
As discussed previously, a baseline must be selected in order to compare current cost
estimates. Three baselines can be selected from the SAR data; the planning estimate (PE),
the development estimate (DE), and the production estimate (PdE). The PE is associated
with MS I, the DE is associated with MS II, and the PdE is associated with MS Ula. Each
acquisition program does not have all of these baselines. RAND conducted a cost growth
study in 1993 that incorporated 278 DoD-wide programs. Of these 278 programs only 38
included a planning estimate. (Drezner, 1993)
Since the DE is the most prevalent, the majority of cost research uses the DE
as the baseline. However, selection of the DE as a baseline does not ensure consistency. A
DE can change during the life of a program due to previous error, restructuring, or in some
case seemingly arbitrary change. In these cases a researcher must use their best judgement
to minimize adding error to the baseline. (Hough, 1992)
b. Cost Exclusion
Another problem with the SAR database is that not all costs are included in
the SAR. Contractors sometimes pay a portion of the RDT&E effort in order to win a
contract. In addition, if the program is being procured under a firm-fixed-price contract,
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then any cost over the agreed upon price is entirely paid by the contractor and it is not
included in the SAR. (Hough, 1992)
A recent example of this potential problem is the F-22 Rapter already
mentioned in Chapter II. This Air Force Program is currently experiencing cost growth
problems in the billion-dollar range. In order to appease Congress and demonstrate
confidence in their cost management goals, Lockheed Martin agreed to produce the first two
shipments of planes with a fixed-price contract. (Schneider, 1999) This seems to be a good
arrangement for the Government because if cost problems continue then Lockheed Martin
will absorb them. However, this is a problem when conducting cost research because the
cost growth over the fixed-price contract will not be submitted in the SARs.
c. Incomplete Database
If a program is designated as "highly sensitive classified (black program)"
then that program is excluded from submitting SARs. Usually these black programs
incorporate cutting-edge technology and require immediate fielding. These two aspects of a
black program could lead to significant cost growth; however, this growth is unable to be
incorporated into cost growth studies. (Hough, 1992)
Some program SARs are still classified which excludes their cost data from
being utilized in this type of research. An example of this problem occurred in this research.
The first three SARs and the sixth SAR for the Lance program are still classified, although
these SARs are over 30 years old. A related problem occurred when extracting cost data for
modification programs. Sometimes a separate SAR is not submitted for modifications, the
information is just included in the original program SAR. An example encountered in this
research is the Ml Abrams tank. The M1A1 and M1A2 modifications are included in the
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original Ml SARs. These SARs separate both schedule and performance data for the Ml,
the M1A1, and the M1A2 programs. However, the cost data for these same programs is not
separated in the SARs. This problem also occurred in extracting cost data for the ASAS,
MCS, Stinger RMP, and ATACMS modification programs.
d. Inflation Adjustments
The last disadvantage of using SAR information that is addressed is inflation
adjustments. As discussed in the advantages section, since 1975 SAR data is presented in
current and baseline dollars. However, prior to 1975 all costs were reported in current
dollars. Efforts to calculate a base year cost based on inflation for these programs (1969 -
1974) have been difficult sometimes resulting in negative base year cost changes. Most
studies just delete these SARs from the cost growth research (Hough, 1992).
The key to this section is understanding the SAR advantages and
disadvantages and then developing a methodology that minimizes the disadvantages. The
effects of all of these disadvantages can not be entirely deleted, and a researcher must use
good judgement in developing their methodology. It is also important to completely explain
any assumptions and judgements made during the research. This will ensure readers
understand exactly what the data analysis is representing.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter provides information on the sources for the cycle time and cost data, the
CTAT and SARs respectively. The methodologies are discussed in detail to explain the
process used to analyze the cycle time and cost data as presented in Chapter IV.
Understanding these methodologies is necessary to fully comprehend the analysis results as
presented in Chapter IV and Chapter V.
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This chapter also thoroughly discusses both the advantages and disadvantages of
using SAR data for this type of variation analysis. Knowledge of these advantages and
disadvantages is important for understanding both the cycle time and cost methodologies,
and the analysis results presented in Chapter IV and Chapter V.
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IV. CYCLE TIME AND COST VARIATION ANALYSIS
An unreasonably long acquisition cycle - ten to fifteen years for our major
weapon systems. .
.
is a central problem from which most other acquisition
problems stem: It leads to unnecessarily high cost of development. . . It leads
to obsolete technology in our fielded equipment.
. . (Packard Commission,
1986).
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a statistical analysis of Army acquisition program's cycle time
and cost variation. Cycle time and cost data is analyzed by commodity (Tactical Missile,
C3I, etc) within each of the two program groups; full acquisition programs and modification
programs. Data is also analyzed by comparing these two groups. The purpose of this
chapter is to provide an understanding of the overall cycle time and cost growth trends as
captured by the SAR data.
B. ANALYSIS OF CYCLE TIME VARIATION
This section presents the results of analyzing the cycle time data from the CTAT.
The analysis in this section is divided into four parts. This section's first part provides the
results of analyzing the full acquisition programs. The second part of this section analyzes
the cycle time data from the modification programs, and the third part compares the full
acquisition programs to the modifications concluding with a comparison of program lengths.
The final part of this section provides a correlation analysis of the cycle time data.
1. Full Acquisition Cycle Programs
As mentioned, each of the programs in this group have a full acquisition cycle; MS
I, MS II, MS HI, and IOC. Programs that did not incorporate one or more of these





























Figure 6: Average Growth by Programs Commodity
The previous figure shows the average cycle time growth by commodity for the full
acquisition program group. This group of 21 Army programs has a total cycle time growth
(MS I - IOC) of 41 1 months or 34.3 years. The average growth (MS I - IOC) for these
programs is 19.6 months or 1.6 years. Two of the group commodities, PGM and
Helicopters, exceeded the average growth of 19.6 months with average growths of 51 and
25.8 months respectively.
The interval between MS II to MS HI, Phase n, has the greatest growth of 300
months which is 73.9% of the overall total cycle time growth of 41 1 months. Phase II is the
only phase in which each commodity has a positive cycle time growth. As shown in Figure
6, PGM has the greatest average growth in this phase, 52 months. This average growth is
not due to an outlyer program. The variance for the three PGM programs is only 7 with a
standard deviation of 2.6.
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All of the commodities in Phase I have a growth of +- 1 month except for the
Helicopter commodity. The Helicopter commodity has an average cycle time growth of 23
months. This deviation from the rest of the commodities is due to the RAH-66 program.
Both the RAH-66 #1 and the RAH-66 #2 have large Phase I cycle time growths of 43 and
48 months respectively. The other two programs in the helicopter commodity, the AH-64A
and the UH-60A, have cycle time growths of 1 month and months respectively. Of the 21
programs in this group, only three programs besides the RAH-66 have positive cycle time
growths in Phase I. The Longbow AH-64 program has the next largest Phase I growth of 5
months. Fifteen of the twenty-one programs have cycle time growth in this phase.
In Phase IE, four of five program commodities have a negative growth, with C3I
being the only commodity that demonstrates a positive growth. Of the five C3I programs,
SMART-T is the only program with negative growth, 1 month. The other four C3I







































Figure 7: Average Percentage Growth by Programs Commodity
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Figure 7 represents the average percentage growth for Army programs in the full
acquisition group. Each program commodity has an overall positive average percentage
growth (MS I - IOC). Cumulatively, programs in this group have a total percentage growth
of 347% with an average of 17.8%. Two program commodities, PGM and Helicopters,
exceed the average percentage growths with growths of 45.9% and 20.1%, respectively.
Each commodity also has a positive percentage growth in every phase except for PGM and
Vehicles in Phase IE.
Phase HI has the largest average percentage growth of 1 14.5% and this phase also
has the greatest variation. The C3I commodity has a positive average percentage growth of
671% while the PGM commodity has a negative average percentage growth of 192%.
These large variations are due to a single program in each of the commodities. As an
example, in the C3I program commodity, the AN/TTC-39 program has a percentage growth
of 3200% because the original estimate for Phase III was zero months and the actual time
was 32 months.
As with the average growth, each program commodity in Phase I has a very small
average percentage growth, +-2%, except for the helicopter commodity. This commodity
has an average percentage growth of 44.8% again due to the RAH-66 program. In Phase I,
RAH-66 #1 has a percentage growth of 134.4% and the RAH-66 #2 program has a
percentage growth of 42.9%. The other two programs in this commodity, the AH-64A and
the UH-60A, have percentage growths of 2% and 0%.
2. Modifications
As with the full acquisition cycle group, each of the programs in this group has a full
acquisition cycle; MS II, MS HI, and IOC. Programs that did not incorporate one or more of
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Figure 8: Average Growth by Programs Commodity (Modifications)
The previous figure shows the average cycle time growth by commodity for the
modification program group. This group of 14 Army programs has a total cycle time
growth (MS II - IOC) of 57 months or 4.8 years. Each program commodity has an overall
positive cycle time growth and the average overall growth (MS II - IOC) for these programs
are 4 months. Two of the group commodities, C3I and helicopters, exceed the average
growth of 4 months with average growths of 9 and 5 month respectively.
Phase II has the largest cycle time growth, 120 months, and the largest average
growth of 9 months. The majority of the positive growth, 79 of 120 months or 66%, is
driven by the C3I commodity. Within this commodity, the MCS BLUI modification
accounted for 60 of the 79 months of growth.
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Phasem has a negative cycle time growth, 70 months, and a negative average cycle
time growth of 5 months. As with Phase n, the C3I commodity program group accounted
for the majority of the cycle time growth, 61 of the 70 months or 87% of the negative
growth. Within this commodity, the ASAS BLII modification accounted for 51 of the 61














Commodity ms n - msm msm - ioc ms n - ioc
Tactical Missiles 14.15% 4.84% 8.00%
QC3I 39138% -86.40% 111.09%
D Helicopters 5.29% 21.86% 8.62%
PGM 9.13% 84.44% 3.98%
Vehicles 5.69% 17.01% 4.09%
Figure 9: Average Percentage Growth by Program Commodity (Modifications)
The above figure represents the average percentage growth for the Army programs
in the modification group. Each program commodity has an overall positive average
percentage growth (MS II - IOC). Cumulatively, programs in this group have a total
percentage growth of 29 1 .7% with an average of 20.8%. Only one program commodity,
C3I, exceeds the average with an average percentage growth of 1 1 1.1%. Each commodity
has a positive percentage growth in every phase except for the C3I commodity in Phase HI.
As with the average growth, C3I demonstrates the most percentage growth
variability. In Phase II, the C3I commodity has an average percentage growth of 391.4%.
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This positive growth is due to the MCS BLDI program, which has a percentage growth of
750% due to a 60-month positive growth from an estimated baseline of 8 months. The rest
of the program commodities in this phase have a percentage growth range between 5% and
14%.
Phase HI has a positive average percentage growth of 14.8%. In this phase, the C3I
commodity and the PGM commodity groups cancel each other. The C3I group has a
negative average percentage growth of 86.4%. The PGM group has a positive average
percentage growth of 84.4%. The positive growth for the PGM commodity is misleading.
Only the ATACMS BAT BLII program in this commodity has a positive growth, 400%.
The other two programs, the ATACMS BAT P3I and the ATACMS BAT BL HA, have
negative percentage growths of 66.7% and 80% respectively.
3. Comparison of Full Cycle Programs and Modifications
This section compares the full acquisition cycle time data with the modification
cycle time data. This section contains a graph of the average growth comparison by phases
and the average percentage growth comparison by phases. Additional graphs comparing the
full cycle programs and the modification programs can be found in Appendix C. These
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Figure 10: Average Growth Comparison
As figure 10 shows, only the modification group in Phase HI has a negative average
growth. The negative average growth occurs because three of the five modification
commodities (C3I, PGM, and Tactical Missile) have negative growth in this phase. The C3I
commodity has the greatest negative average growth of 30.5 months. Phase HI also has the
least amount of average growth for the full cycle group, .8 1 months. All of the full cycle
commodities have a negative average growth in this phase except for C3I. The C3I
commodity has an average growth of 12.4 months.
Phase II shows the greatest average growth for both of the program groups. The full
cycle group has an average growth of 14.3 months, which is 73% of the overall total
program growth. All of the five program commodities in the full cycle group have positive
average growth in this phase. All of the commodities have less than 10 months growth
except for PGM and Tactical Missiles which have 52 months and 13.6 months growth
respectively.
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In Phase n, the modification group has an average growth of 9.2 months, which
exceeds the overall total growth for this group. This situation occurs because of the negative
growth in Phase HI. As with the full cycle group, all of the modification program
commodities have positive growth in this phase. All of the commodities have less than 10
months growth except the C3I commodity, which has 39.5 months growth.
Overall, both groups have positive average growth from program start to IOC. The
average program growth for the full cycle group is 19.6 months which is almost five times
the average growth of the modification group. Within the full cycle group, PGM
demonstrated the most average growth (52months) while vehicles showed the least amount
of average growth (3.3 months). Within the modification group, C3I demonstrated the most
growth (9 months) while PGM showed the least growth (2 months). All of the commodities
in both groups have positive average growth from program start to IOC. For each
commodity, the full cycle average growth is greater than the modification average growth.
The greatest discrepancy
,
between the full cycle and modification schedule growth, occurs
in the PGM commodity. The PGM full cycle growth is 52 months compared to 2 months
for the PGM modification group. The commodity with the closest average growths is the
vehicle commodity. The vehicle full cycle average growth is 3.25 months compared to the
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Figure 11: Comparison of Average Percentage Growth
Initially this graph may not seem to make sense because the full cycle average
percentage growth in Phase HI is much larger than the overall full cycle average percentage
growth. However, the graph is correct because the average percentage growths in each
phase are not additive. The AN/TTC-39 program in the full cycle C3I commodity is used as
an explanatory example. In Phase HI, the AN/TTC-39 has a percentage growth of 3200%
because the program grew from months to 32 months. However, the overall percentage
growth for this program is only 22.9%. This occurs because a negative growth of 8 months
in Phase II means this program has 24 months of growth compared to a 105-month baseline.
In Phase n, the modification group has a greater average percentage growth than the
full cycle group. The modification group's average percentage growth is driven by the C3I
commodity, which has an average percentage growth of 391 .4%. The other four
commodities in the modification group have average percentage growths below 15%. By
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comparison, the full cycle C3I commodity only has a 3.2% average percentage growth in
this phase.
In Phase HI the data is reversed, the full cycle group has a much greater average
percentage growth than the modification group. However, as in Phase II with the
modification group, this average percentage growth is driven by the C3I commodity, which
has an average percentage growth of 671%. By comparison, the C3I commodity in the
modification group has a negative average percentage growth of 86.4%.
Overall, the modification group has a 3% greater average percentage growth than the
full cycle group. Each of the program commodities in both groups has an overall average
percentage growth of 20% or less except for two commodities. The C3I commodity in the
modification group has an average percentage growth of 1 1 1.1% and the PGM commodity
in the full cycle group has an average percentage growth of 45.9%.
Tactical Missiles C3I Helicopters PGM Vehicles Overall
! Full Acquisition Programs Modifications
Figure 12: Army Acquisition Program Average Length
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All of the full acquisition cycle programs have longer program lengths than their
modification program counterparts. The full cycle programs have an average length of
137.2 months or 1 1.4 years and the modification programs have an average length of 69.6
months or 5.8 years. The average length of the full cycle program is double that of the
modifications. Even if Phase I is deleted from the full cycle program length, these programs
still have an average program length of 87.9 months or 7.3 years. This is still 18 months
longer that the modification programs.
The PGM and Helicopter commodities have the longest program lengths in both the
full cycle and the modification groups. The Tactical Missile commodity has the greatest
difference in length between the two groups, 82.5 months or 6.8 years. The PGM
commodity has the greatest difference in length between the two groups when Phase I is
deleted, 39.4 months or 3.3 years. The Helicopter commodity has the least difference
between program lengths when Phase I is deleted, only 4 months.
4. Cycle Time Correlation Analysis
This section presents data on the correlation between cycle time growth and original
estimated program length, and between cycle time percentage growth and original estimated
program length. Correlation between two variables is represented by the coefficient of
correlation (r). The value of (r) can range from -1, which represents perfect negative
correlation, to +1 which represents perfect positive correlation. A coefficient of correlation
of shows that there is no relationship between the two variables. (Levine, 1998)
The next two figures show how cycle time growth (months) correlates to estimated
program length. Figure 13 shows the correlation of cycle time growth to the full cycle
program's estimated program length. The correlation coefficient (r) is only 0.0725 for the
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full cycle programs. This demonstrates that there is very little correlation between estimated
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Figure 13: Correlation of Original Estimate to Cycle Time Growth (Full Cycle)
Figure 14 shows the cycle time growth (months) correlation to estimated program
time for the modification programs. For the modification programs, the correlation
coefficient (r) is -0.6610, which demonstrates that a strong negative correlation exists. This
correlation means that cycle time growth for the modification programs tends to decrease as
the original program estimated length increases. A correlation analysis is also conducted
using the full acquisition cycle programs without the Phase I (MS I - MS H) data. The full
cycle program growth from MS II to IOC is correlated to the estimated full cycle program
length from MS II to IOC. This analysis is a better comparison to the modification analysis.
The result of this analysis is a correlation coefficient (r) of 0.0151, which again shows there
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Figure 14: Correlation of Original Estimate to Cycle Time Growth (Modifications)
The following two figures show how cycle time percentage growth correlates to
estimated program length. Figure 15 show the correlation of cycle time percentage growth
to the full cycle program's estimated program length. The correlation coefficient (r) is
-0.2497 for the full cycle programs. This demonstrates that there is very little correlation or
relationship between estimated program length and cycle time percentage growth for these
programs.
Figure 16 shows the cycle time percentage growth relationship to estimated program
time for the modification programs. For the modification programs, the correlation
coefficient (r) is -0.5288, which demonstrates that a negative correlation exists. This
correlation means that cycle time percentage growth for the modification programs tend to
decrease as the original program estimated length increases. This correlation between the
percentage growth and estimated program length is expected based on the strong correlation
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Figure 16: Correlation of Original Estimate to Cycle Time Percentage Growth
(Modifications)
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C. ANALYSIS OF COST VARIATION
This section presents the results of analyzing the program cost data extracted directly
from the program SARs. The analysis in this section is divided into three parts. The first
part of this section provides the results of analyzing the full acquisition program cost data.
The second part of this section provides a correlation analysis between program cost factors.
The last part of this section compares the full cycle and modification cost data for two of the
commodities; Vehicle and Helicopter. The other modification commodities are unable to be
analyzed due to problems acquiring and extracting these programs' cost data. These
problems are explained in more detail in the second part of this section.
1. Full Acquisition Cycle Programs
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Figure 17: Full Cycle Program Cost Growth Factors
Figure 17 presents the cost growth factors for each commodity in the full cycle
group. As mentioned previously, a cost growth factor of 1 means that there is no cost
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growth. All of the program commodities experience cost growth and four of the five
commodities experience positive cost growth. Overall, these 20 Army programs experience
a TCGF of 54.6 %. This unadjusted growth is important from the resource allocation point
of view. At program inception, decision-makers at both the DoD and Congressional level
make funding decisions based on an initial program cost estimate. Cost increases, for
whatever reason, cause funding problems that require funds to be reallocated between
programs. The reallocation process causes funding instability for numerous other programs
that can lead to inefficient management processes. This affect can snowball leading to cost
growth for all affected programs.
Overall, these programs experience a TCGFA of 49.9%. A 1992 cost growth study
by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) found a DoD program average cost growth of
47%. The Army programs are only slightly higher than the DoD average. Three of the five
commodities experience almost 100% positive cost growth, with the Vehicle commodity the
highest at 105.2%. The IDA study also found Vehicles and Munitions (both air and surface
launched) to have near 100% program cost growth with 96% and 103%, respectively
(Tyson, 1992). The IDA study reported Helicopters at only 42%; however, their study did
not include the RAH-66 with its 179% cost growth through 1997.
The program with the highest cost growth is the Bradley program with a cost growth
of 329%. Excluding this program, the overall adjusted Army cost growth average falls to
34.9% and the Vehicle commodity cost growth average drops to 29.3%. As Figure 17
demonstrates, program cost growth due to schedule variance is small for each commodity.
Overall, STCGF is only 6.2% and schedule accounts for only 14.3% of the adjusted total
cost growth in the Army programs. The other 85.7% is attributed to the other five cost
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Figure 18: Comparison of DEV, PROC, and Total Cost Growth Factors
Figure 18 shows a comparison of the Development, Procurement, and Total cost
growth factors adjusted for quantity. Of the 49.9% TCGFA, DEV cost growth is 38.2% and
PROC is 52. 1 %. In the IDA cost growth study, the DoD average for DEV and PROC is
29% and 56%, respectively (Tyson, 1992). Two of the commodities have a program that
does not include a Procurement cost growth factor; RAH-66 in the Helicopter commodity
and the Crusader in the Vehicle commodity. These two programs do not have a
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Figure 19: Schedule Induced Cost Growth Factors
Figure 19 presents the program cost growth that is due to schedule. As this figure
demonstrates, there is no apparent trend in the schedule induced cost growth. The C3I and
Helicopter commodities show higher DEV schedule induced cost growth, and the other
three commodities show higher PROC schedule induced cost growth. Cost growth can be
caused by different factors in DEV and PROC. In DEV, cost growth is usually associated
with unforeseen technical problems (Tyson, 1999). DEV cost growth can also be driven by
changing requirements. In PROC, cost growth can be associated with production rate
changes, quantity changes, or production problems. An explanation of the relationship
between quantity changes, production rate changes, and schedule changes is presented in
Chapter V.
Figure 20 shows schedule induced program cost variance as a percentage of the
program total cost variance adjusted for quantity. Only two commodities have percentages
above 15% of the total cost variance adjusted for quantity. This figure demonstrates that
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schedule induced cost variance is a small part of the overall adjusted program cost variance.
This percentage is much smaller if a program is not adjusted for the effects of quantity. The
Helicopter commodity has a negative percentage due to the UH-60 program that has a
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Figure 20: Schedule Induced Cost Growth as a Percent ofTCGFA
2. Cost Correlation Analysis
This section presents an analysis of the correlation between program cost related
variables. A correlation analysis is conducted between the program's initial cost estimate
and TCGFA, and between the program's initial cost estimate and STCGF. This analysis
reveals any relationship between the original cost of a program and a program's percentage
cost growth that is adjusted for quantity changes. A correlation analysis is also conducted
between the year a program is initiated (first SAR reporting year) and TCGFA, and between
the year a program starts and STCGF. This analysis reveals any trends in Army program's
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Figure 21: Correlation of Initial Cost Estimate to TCGFA
In this analysis, 15 of the 20 programs have a positive cost growth. Intuitively, it
seems that there should be a negative correlation between TCGFA and the original cost
estimate. In simple terms, a higher initial cost estimate should result in less cost growth. A
correct estimate, which in this case would be higher 75% of the time since 15 of the 20
programs demonstrate positive growth, or a padded cost estimate should mean less
percentage cost growth. However, as Figure 2 1 demonstrates, there is very little correlation
between the original cost estimate and TCGFA. This means that the original cost estimate
has little influence on a program's percentage cost growth. This relationship is explored in
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Figure 22: Correlation of Initial Cost Estimate to STCGF
As with Figure 21, there is little correlation between STCGF and a program's initial
cost estimate. Figures 23 and 24 show the correlation between the year of program start and
two cost growth factors; TCGFA and STCGF. Acquisition personnel would like to see a
negative correlation between these two factors. The acquisition community should learn
from past mistakes in both cost estimation procedures and management practices. As
corrective actions are incorporated into the acquisition process, program cost growth should
decrease. However, these two figures demonstrate little correlation between program start
and percentage cost growth. There is a negative correlation coefficient between program
start and TCGFA; however, it is not statistically significant. These results are not specific to
Army programs. An IDA study in 1989 also concluded that throughout DoD there is little
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Figure 24: Correlation of Program Start Year to STCGF
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3. Comparison of Full Cycle Programs and Modifications
Only two of the commodities can be compared between full cycle programs and
modification programs. As explained in the cost methodology section and the SAR
disadvantages section, the modification programs in three of the commodities have cost data
that is combined with the original program's cost data.
2.5
TCGF TCGFA STCGF DCGF DCGFA SDCGF PCGF PCGFA SPCGF
Full Cycle Modifications
Figure 25: Comparison of Full Cycle versus Modification (Helicopters)
Figure 25 shows that for the majority of the cost growth factors, the full cycle
programs have higher percentage cost growth than the modification programs. For the
Helicopter commodity only the STCGF and the SPCGF have higher cost growth for
modification programs. This means the Helicopter full cycle programs have 61.3% more
cost growth than the modification programs.
For the Vehicle commodity, each cost growth factor is higher for the full cycle
programs. The full cycle programs have a TCGFA of 2.052 versus a TCGFA of 1 .356 for
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the modification programs. In this case, the full cycle programs have 69.6% more cost
growth than the modification programs.
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Figure 26: Comparison of Full Cycle versus Modification (Vehicles)
D. SUMMARY
This chapter provides a statistical analysis of Army program's cycle time growth and
cost growth information. The cycle time and cost growth data is analyzed for the full cycle
programs, the modification programs, and then the data is compared between these two
groups. A complete comparison of the cost growth analysis between the full cycle programs
and the modification programs is impossible due to an inability to extract modification cost
data from the SARs. Summary information for cycle time data is presented in Table 6 and
summary information for the cost data is presented in Table 7.
Correlation analysis is also conducted with both the cycle time and cost data. This
analysis explores the relationship between program cycle time growth and the original
program length estimate for both the full cycle groups and the modification groups. A
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strong correlation of -0.661 is revealed in the modification group between original program
estimate and cycle time growth.
A correlation analysis is conducted between the program's initial cost estimate and
TCGFA, and between the program's initial cost estimate and STCGF. Correlation analysis
is also conducted between the year a program is initiated (first SAR reporting year) and
TCGFA, and between the year a program starts and STCGF. This analysis is only
conducted with the full cycle programs due to the small number of modification programs
available for analysis. The original program cost estimate and the year of program start has
little affect on TCGFA and STCGF. Thus, none of the cost correlation analyses
demonstrates any significant correlation or relationship between the cost variables.
Table 6: Summary of Cycle Time Data
Category Full Cycle Modifications
Average Growth 19.6 4.1
Average % Growth 17.8% 20.8%
Phase Largest AVE Growth Phase H (14.3) Phase H (9.2)
Phase Largest AVE % Growth Phase m (114.6%) Phase H (67.7%)
Commodity Largest AVE Growth PGM (51) C3I (9)
Commodity Largest AVE % Growth PGM (45.9%) C3I(111%)












Program Largest Growth SADARM (60) MCSBLm(50)
Program Largest % Growth SADARM (51.7%) MCS BL ffl (250%)




Program Shortest Length SCAMP (72) M1A1 (20)
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Table 7: Summary of Cost Data
Category Full Cycle
Cost Growth Factors
Overall Average TCGFA 1.499
Overall Average STCGF 1.062
Commodity Largest TCGFA Vehicle (2.052)
Commodity Largest STCGF PGM (1.193)
Program Largest TCGFA Bradley (4.329)
Program Largest STCGF SADARM (1.434)
Commodity Least TCGFA C3I (.897)
Commodity Least STCGF C3I (.974)
Program Least TCGFA ATACMS APAM (.759)
Program Least STCGF ANATC-39 (.874)
This chapter provides an analysis of cycle time growth and cost growth independent
of each other. Chapter V presents an analysis of how cost growth is affected by schedule
growth.
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V. CYCLE TIME AND COST VARIATION CORRELATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents information and analysis concerning the interdependence or
correlation of program cycle time and cost variation. Section B provides a background of
this issue by discussing various conflicting theories on the correlation between cycle time
and cost growth. This section concludes with the results of two related research studies.
Section C presents a multiple regression analysis of program cycle time and cost correlation
for the selected Army programs.
B. PROGRAM CYCLE TIME AND COST RESEARCH
In the last five years, numerous reform initiatives have been proposed to reduce
program schedule and cost. The 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining ACT (FASA), the
1997 DSAC, and the 1986 Packard Commission set goals to reduce program cycle time by
50%. The 1996 DoD National Performance Review (NPR) set a goal of reducing cycle time
by 25%. Cycle time reduction's possible affect on program cost is not addressed by any of
these initiatives. (Czelusniak, 1998)
1. Theories of Cycle Time and Cost Correlation
The Under Secretary of Defense (Advanced Technology), Mr. Eash, provided a
briefing to the Acquisition Reform Senior Steering Group (ARSSG) on 1 1 AUG 98. He
reiterated that the goal is to reduce cycle time by 25 - 50%. Mr. Eash stated that the longer a
program runs (schedule growth), the likelihood of program cost growth increases.
"Schedule delays cause cost to grow exponentially by 4 (Eash, 1998)." As mentioned in
83
Chapter 1, the GAO reports that schedule delays will likely increase program cost; however,
the amount ofthe cost growth is unspecified.
Philip Thomas, the author of Competitiveness Through Total Cycle Time, also
addresses the affect of a reduced schedule on program cost. Mr. Thomas states that
commercial cycle time reduction management concepts should be applied to the defense
industry. He believes that these concepts should reduce program cycle time by 50%. This
cycle time reduction should result in a comparable 50% reduction in program cost.
(Thomas, 1990)
The ideas discussed above pass the common sense test. In theory, program cycle
time and cost should be interrelated. Let's first begin with development cost and discuss the





Figure 27: Theoretical Program Schedule versus Development Cost Curve
Development cost efficiency would exist, on a cost vs. schedule curve that
represents alternative combinations of cost and schedule that achieve a particular program
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performance goal. Within the efficient arc B-C, Point C exists that minimizes development
schedule and cost (Peck & Scherer, 1962). Moving to the right of Point C would increase
cost and schedule, and be an inefficient combination of these program factors. This
inefficiency could be due to mistakes, inefficient management, or previously unknown and
unexpected conditions. As the schedule continues to increase, the problems compound, the
program becomes riskier, and the slope of the curve increases representing accelerated cost
growth. The extreme right slope of the curve increases because larger schedule growths are
probably due to increasingly difficult problems. As schedule growth increases, the program
will begin to receive oversight attention. Oversight personnel could direct the program to
increase testing to solve the problem, which would increase cost. The oversight personnel
could also begin to reduce funding, until the problem is solved, leading to program
stretchout also increasing program cost.
Moving along the curve to the left, from Point C towards Point B, increases cost;
however, schedule is reduced and the combination of schedule and cost is still efficient.
Moving to the left, to reduce schedule, requires additional resources in terms of personnel
and equipment. The increase in resources increases the program's cost. The middle section
of the cost vs. schedule curve should be relatively flat, because in this region small
incremental schedule changes should not increase cost dramatically. However, the slope of
the cost-schedule curve increases as the program's schedule moves to either extreme on the
curve.
The extreme left slope of the curve increases because larger amounts of personnel
and equipment would be required to achieve the same incremental schedule increase that
required less resources near the Point C. As the curve continues to the extreme left past
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Point B schedule actually begins to increase again and the cost-schedule combinations
achieved are inefficient. For example, Point A is inefficient because more resources are
required to achieve the associated schedule than to achieve the same schedule outcome
along arc B-C. This effect occurs because a minimum achievable program schedule exists.
The addition of resources on the arc B-A makes management, coordination, and integration
of resources difficult. These problems could actually cause inefficiencies that increase
program schedule.
The cost-schedule curve, AD, in Figure 27 represents combinations of cost and
schedule for a certain program quality level. However, other cost-schedule curves exist for
different quality levels. On the curve Q , the movement to the right of Point C could be due
to technical problems that increase schedule and cost. It is probable that the addition of
resources used to solve this problem could result in a slightly higher program quality level.
Program personnel could argue that the increase in cost and schedule is worthwhile because
of the increase in program quality, Qi, represented by Point F. However, this assumption is
incorrect. As Figure 27 demonstrates, Point F is still inefficient on curve Qi. If Qi is the
initial quality objective, Point G is the least cost point and thus Point F to the right of Point
G is inefficient. (Peck & Scherer, 1962) At this new performance level, the segment of
curve Qi that achieves efficiency in development cost is the arc, H-G.
At this time, an explanation of "adjusting for quantity" and a discussion of the
production cost-quantity curve is also necessary. Quantity changes can affect program cost
in two ways; volume changes that directly affect cost growth, and volume changes that
indirectly affect cost growth through secondary affects. Volume cost growth is
approximately represented by the Quantity cost variance reported in SAR Section 13. "All
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quantity changes shall be calculated using the baseline cost-quantity relationship in effect
(DoD 7000.3, 1987, p.3-10)." The cost difference between the baseline cost-quantity
relationship and the current cost-quantity relationship is allocated to the other cost variance
categories (DoD 7000.3-G). This means that the quantity cost variance is based on the
volume change between quantities.
Secondary effects such as spare changes or production rate changes are allocated to
the other six cost variance categories. In this study, adjusting the program cost growth for
quantity means adjusting the cost due to volume changes. The secondary cost effects are
excluded from these quantity adjustments. The secondary effects are included in this
research because the objective is to determine if a relationship exists between cost growth
and schedule growth. One reason schedule growth occurs is because of the quantity
change's secondary effect, such as production rate changes. These secondary effects should
be analyzed but their measurement is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Figure 28 illustrates a hypothesized long-term relationship between production cost,
quantity, and production rates. Recall that Figure 27 portrays the relationship between
development cost and schedule. Figure 28 focuses only on production cost. This figure is
derived theoretically and is not based on specific empirical analysis. The cost scale is
exaggerated and not drawn to scale in order to demonstrate this hypothesized relationship.
Figure 28 should help visualize the relationship between quantity change, production rate
change, and schedule that is described on the previous page. As Figure 28 demonstrates,
quantity and production rate affect the production cost. Along the arc A-D, when quantity
increases, the schedule remains the same by adjusting the production rate. Therefore, if a
program is operating at Point C and then moves to Point D, the production cost increases,
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but the schedule remains the same. This situation occurs because, even though the quantity
doubles, the production rate also doubles and thus 2*Q can be produced in the same amount




























Figure 28. Theoretical Production Cost versus Quantity Curve
However, ifthe program moves from Point C to Point D* then the new quantity,
2*Q, takes longer to produce and schedule growth occurs. A portion ofthe cost growth, Ci
- C, is associated with this quantity change due to the change in volume, and some of the
cost growth is due to the schedule growth resulting from the secondary effect, the
production rate change. A program could also move from Point D to Point D', which
reflects an increase in the production rate to reduce schedule when total quantity is not
changed. In this situation, cost growth is due to schedule change.
A program could also move from Point D to Point D*, which is due to a decrease in
the production rate and program schedule will increase. In this situation, production cost is
reduced by the increase in a program's schedule and the associated increase in production
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rate. However, as mentioned previously the cost scale is exaggerated and neither the cost
increases nor decreases are as severe as depicted. Production cost is only part of the cost
growth associated with schedule change.
Figure 28 represents the long-term planning view of how production cost, quantity,
and production rate interact. Short-term changes in the production rate are not addressed by
this relationship. Unplanned production rate or quantity changes that need to be addressed
immediately to solve problems may induce a different relationship between these variables.
It is also important to understand that program cost growth is a combination of development
cost growth and production cost growth.
2. Cycle Time and Cost Correlation Research
In 1993, RAND Corporation conducted a cost growth study for the U.S. Air Force,
which included all types of programs from all of the services. One aspect of this research
was an analysis of the affect of schedule slip (schedule growth) on program cost growth.
The researchers expected a strong correlation between these two program elements.
However, the results demonstrated that a significant correlation between schedule slip and
program cost growth does not exist. (Drezner, 1993)
In 1962, Peck and Scherer conducted an analysis of the correlation between
development cost growth and schedule slippage. Their program sample consisted of ten
DoD aircraft and missile programs. The following figure is a graph of their data. Peck and
Scherer found that as program cycle time increases, the larger the development cost growth.
The correlation coefficient in this study was .57, which is significant at the . 10 level. (Peck
& Scherer, 1962) This analysis shows that there is a relationship between development cost
and schedule growth. However, it is important to understand that the cost growth factors in
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both this thesis and the RAND study represent total cost growth adjusted for quantity. The
Peck and Scherer analysis demonstrates that prior to production, a relationship exists
between program cost and schedule growth. Therefore, two reasons could exist that explain
these conflicting results. Either more homogeneous groups allow a more detailed analysis,
or the addition of production costs cause the correlation effect to disappear.
7 y = 23167x - 0.0028
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R2 = 03397















Figure 29. Peck and Scherer Schedule and Cost Variation Correlation
As the information in this section demonstrates, the theories and research concerning
the relationship between cycle time and cost is contradictory. The RAND study seems to be
the most relevant because of the large sample size, representation of adjusted total program
cost, and because it is only 6 years old. However, the RAND study recommends further
research in this area, specifically using more homogeneous groupings. More homogeneous
groups, such as the sample in this research, allow for a more detailed study. Analysis at this
level may identify relationships between schedule and cost that are masked at the macro
level.
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C. CYCLE TIME AND COST CORRELATION
This section presents an analysis of the correlation between program cost growth and
cycle time growth. This analysis is divided into four parts. The first three parts of this
section present the results of three simple regressions between cost growth factors and
schedule growth factors (SGF) also referred to as cycle time growth. These results are
presented in descending order of magnitude. First, an analysis is conducted to determine if
cycle time growth affects unadjusted cost growth (TCGF). Then a more refined analysis is
needed to assess whether cycle time growth affects quantity adjusted cost growth (TCGFA).
The last single regression is still more refined and determines if cycle time growth affects
schedule induced cost growth (STCGF). A null hypothesis is made, consistent with the
conclusions of the RAND study, that cycle time growth does not affect cost growth.
Ho = Cycle time growth does not affect cost growth
Hi = Cycle time growth affects cost growth
If Ho is rejected and Hi is accepted, other assumptions are explored as follows:
TCGFA has a larger "r" than TCGF
STCGF has a larger "r" than TCGFA
The following rationale determines these assumptions. TCGF includes cost growth
for all seven variance categories that affect cost growth. This includes quantity change,
which is the largest cost growth driver after inflation (Hough, 1992). When using TCGF,
cycle time is one of the seven variance factors, so if there is a correlation between cost
growth and cycle time growth, the "r" value should be the smallest with TCGF. The
correlation between TCGFA and cycle time should be the next largest because the cost
growth is adjusted for quantity. Adjusting for quantity should more clearly demonstrate the
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relationship between cycle time growth and the other six cost variance categories. The
relationship between STCGF and cycle time growth should have the largest correlation.
This seems obvious because STCGF is schedule induced cost growth as reported in the SAR

















Figure 30. Explanation of Cost Growth Factors
The last part of this section presents the results of a multiple regression analysis
between TCGFA and three other variables. These variables are initial program cost
estimate, initial program schedule, and final program schedule.
1. Regression Analysis with TCGF
Figure 3 1 shows the relationship between TCGF and schedule growth factor. The
regression analysis results in a coefficient of correlation (r) of 0.4978, which is significant at
the .05 level. Thus, Ho is rejected and the alternate hypothesis is accepted. This
demonstrates that a relationship exists between TCGF and schedule growth factor that is
significant at the .05 level. In this analysis, one data point is an outlyer and this point is
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removed from the analysis. The outlyer data is from the Bradley program. As explained in
Appendix D, this program includes large cost adjustments in an effort to ensure only
Bradley program costs are included in the cost growth factor. As Table 8 on page 101
shows, there is a large variance between the Bradley cost growth factors calculated by IDA,
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Figure 3 1 : Correlation of TCGF to Schedule Growth Factor
2. Regression Analysis with TCGFA
Figure 32 presents the results of the regression analysis between TCGFA and
schedule growth factor. As in the previous regression analysis, the Bradley program is also
removed from this analysis to maintain consistency. This regression results in a "r" of
0.7539, which is significant at the .01 level. Ho is rejected and Hi is accepted. This means
that a significant relationship exists between TCGFA and the schedule growth factor. Since
the "r" value is positive, as schedule growth increases, the program's cost growth increases.
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A regression analysis including the Bradley program data is presented in Appendix C. Even


















y = 1.5738x- 0.5203
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Figure 32: Correlation ofTCGFA to Schedule Growth Factor
Since Ho is rejected, the comparison of the strength of the association, "r" can be
addressed. In this case, the first assumption is correct because the TCGFA "r" is larger than
the TCGF "r". This means that the relationship between cost growth and schedule growth is
more significant when the cost growth is adjusted for quantity. This result makes sense and
is expected.
3. Regression Analysis with STCGF
Figure 33 presents the results of the regression analysis between STCGF and the
schedule growth factors. As with the two previous regression analyses, the outlyer Bradley
program is removed from the STCGF regression analysis. In this analysis, the STCGF "r"
value is 0.3782, which is lower than both of the previous regression analyses. This analysis
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demonstrates that the relationship between STCGF and SGF is not significant at the .10
level. This result means that there is a higher correlation between TCGFA and schedule
growth factor than between the STCGF and schedule growth factor. This result is
unexpected due to the explanations presented previously in this chapter. The STCGF
variable is adjusted to include only cost growth due to schedule changes. For this reason,
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Figure 33: Correlation of STCGF to Schedule Growth Factor
A plausible explanation for the results of this regression analysis is that some of the
cost variance due to schedule growth is attributed to one of the other five cost variance
categories. If this situation occurs, then the schedule induced cost growth factor (STCGF)
does not represent all of the cost growth due to schedule growth. Thus, the relationship
between STCGF and the schedule growth factor is not as significant as it would be if the
schedule variance category represented all of the schedule induced cost growth.
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4. Multiple Regression Analysis
The last part of Section C provides the results of a multi-regression analysis of the
TCGFA. Regression analysis is conducted with three dependent variables in log log form
(Ln); TCGF, TCGFA, AND STCGF. The independent variables are the Ln (initial cost
estimate in 1998 constant dollars), Ln (initial schedule estimate in months), and the Ln
(current schedule estimate in months). The log log form is a more complex method of
presenting this data than the straight linear model. However, the log log form is used
because this form has better statistical properties and identifies the effects of initial cost and
initial schedule on TCGFA. The log log form also enables the multi-regression equation to
be transformed in order to arrive at an equation in terms ofTCGFA and schedule growth
factor. The multiple regression analysis indicates that the best model uses Ln TCGFA as the
dependent variable. This is consistent with the results obtained in the simple regression
analysis.
The multi-regression analysis that is presented in this section uses the following
variables:
• Dependent Variable: Ln (Current (final program) cost adjusted for quantity in
1998 constant year dollars) (CostAQ)
• Independent Variables:
- Ln (Initial Program Cost in 1998 constant year dollars) (Cost^)
Ln (Initial Schedule in months) (Schediw)
- Ln (Current Schedule in months) (SchedcuR)
As explained in Chapter HI, each cost dollar amount is in constant program base-year
dollars; however, the base-year differs between programs. In order to conduct this
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regression analysis, the cost dollar amounts need to be in the same base-year. Total
Obligation Authority (TOA) 1999 DoD deflators are used to adjust the various base-years to
the 1998 base-year used in this research.
The results of the multiple regression are shown below in the regression equation.
Ln(CostAQ) = -2.6 + 1.15*Ln(CostiN) - l.ll^Sched^) + 1.41*Ln(SchedcuR)
Each of the regression coefficients is significant to the .01 level. This equation demonstrates
that a 1% change in the initial cost leads to a 1.15% change in the final cost adjusted for
quantity when the other variables are held constant. This means that higher initial cost
programs could have greater cost growth. This regression equation also shows that a 1%
change in initial schedule results in a -1.1% change in the final cost adjusted for quantity.
This means that a longer initial program length leads to a lower final cost. This makes sense
from the long-term production graph that has already been discussed. If you plan for a
longer program, then the program final cost would be less than when based on an overly
optimistic schedule. The same equation also demonstrates that a 1% change in final
schedule results in a 1 .4% change in the final program cost. Since all other variables are
held constant, the 1% change in final schedule is equal to a 1% change in schedule growth.
This result makes sense due to the results of the simple correlation analysis that shows cost
growth is affected by schedule growth.
The next step in this analysis is to transform the regression equation into an
equation. This form is desired because now the equation is in terms ofTCGFA and SGF,
which are the norms for this type of research. The simple regression analysis is also
conducted using these factors.
Ln(TCGFA) = -2.6 + .15*Ln(CostiN) + 1.41*Ln(SGF) + .3*Ln(SchedIN)
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The above equation is analyzed using regression analysis to determine the significance of
the coefficients and to verify that the same coefficients are determined. The results of the
regression analysis show that the initial cost is significant to the .06 level and that the SGF is
significant to the .01 level. The effect of the initial schedule is not significant in this
equation. Since the initial schedule is not significant in this case, the regression equation is
reestimated without the initial schedule variable. The results of this new multiple regression
analysis show that SGF is significant to the .01 level and initial program cost is significant to
the .05 level. The following regression equation shows the multiple regression results.
Ln(TCGFA) = -1.2 + .165*Ln(CostiN) + 1.29*Ln(SGF)
This equation shows that if the initial program cost changes by 1% then the TCGFA
changes by a factor of .165% and that if the SGF changes by 1% then the TCGFA changes
by 1.29%. The antilog of this equation is also available to provide the following equation in
terms of TCGFA.
TCGFA = e 1 "24 * Cost^ 165 * SGF 1 29
As indicated holding the initial cost constant, this equation shows that a 1% increase in the
schedule causes TCGFA to increase by a factor of 1.29. This is considerably less than the
factor of 4 that was presented by Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Advanced
Technology) in a briefing on cycle time reduction in 1998 (Eash, 1998).
The limitations of this model must be understood. This model is based on a multiple
regression analysis of only 19 data points. The Bradley program is deleted as an outlyer as
described earlier in this chapter. This model also initially only includes three independent
variables and results in an equation of only two independent variables. There are numerous
other factors that could affect both the cost growth and the schedule growth that are not
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explored in this analysis of the relationship between cost and schedule. This log normal
model also assumes that the full effect of the other causes of cost growth are either captured
through the effect of these factors on schedule growth or are unrelated to either the initial
cost levels or to schedule growth. A more complete model would need to account for all of
these factors.
This simple model is derived to better understand the simple correlation results. The
simple correlation results demonstrate that a relationship exists between schedule growth
and cost growth. This simple model provides a limited understanding of the magnitude of
that relationship, and may have only limited value in predicting how an actual schedule
change affects a program's actual final cost. An explanatory model would need to be of a
high-tier order and include a detailed understanding of the numerous variables that affect
program growth, of which only one is schedule growth. A particularly important variable
that must be included in any cost prediction model is the performance level. More
discussion of this type of predictor model is discussed in the recommendations section of
Chapter VI.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter provides an analysis of the effects of program schedule growth on
program cost growth. The postulated theories and research conclusion on this topic do not
always agree. Logic and common sense provide a theory that program cost should increase
as program schedule increases as depicted in Figure 27 on page 84. However, research
conducted by RAND and IDA does not find a significant correlation between these two
important elements of an acquisition program. However, the research conducted by RAND
and IDA incorporates all categories of acquisition programs procured by all four services.
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This type of research provides a macro-view of cost trends and thus some cost trends may
be masked at this level of analysis. (Drezner, 1993)
The Peck and Scherer research in 1962 and the results of this research support the
hypothesis that some cost trends are masked at the macro-level. The Peck and Scherer
research includes 10 aircraft and tactical missile programs. This research includes 20 Army
programs that incorporate the entire acquisition cycle from MSI to IOC. Not all of the
programs in this research have reached IOC; however, each program intends to incorporate
MSI to IOC in their acquisition strategy. The research on the affects of schedule growth on
cost growth, using homogeneous groups, demonstrates that an association exists between
schedule growth and cost growth. The Peck and Scherer research shows the relationship
between cost growth adjusted for quantity and schedule growth is significant at the .10 level,
and this research shows the relationship is significant at the .01 level.
One result of the simple regression analysis conducted in this chapter is unexpected
and not easily explained. This result is that STCGF has less correlation with schedule
growth than TCGFA. A hypothesized explanation is that some of the cost variance that
should be allocated to schedule cost variance is misallocated to one of the other five cost
variance categories. This explanation makes sense for the following reasons. TCGFA
includes all cost growth except cost growth due to quantity, meaning volume cost changes.
This research demonstrates that a relationship exists between TCGFA and SGF. Since
STCGF represents only cost growth induced by schedule changes, this cost growth factor
might be expected to have the highest correlation. Since TCGFA is highly correlated with
schedule growth and STCGF represent schedule induced cost growth, which should have a
higher correlation to schedule growth, a misallocation of cost variance is plausible.
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The multiple regression analysis conducted with TCGFA in the log log model
demonstrates that both initial cost and SGF are significantly related to cost growth. The
initial cost is significant at the .05 level and SGF is significant at the .01 level. A simple
model is derived between TCGFA and the independent variables of initial cost and SGF.
This simple model provides a limited understanding ofthe magnitude of the relationship
between TCGFA and SGF. However, this model should be used very cautiously when
predicting how an actual schedule change affects a program's actual final cost. Further
empirical work might be successful in developing a superior predictor model that would
include all of the numerous variables that affect program growth, ofwhich only one is
schedule growth.
Table 8 presents a comparison of the cost growth factors calculated in this research
as compared to the cost growth factors extracted from RAND and IDA studies. As shown,
the majority ofthe cost growth factors are very similar. The cost growth factors in bold type
represent factors calculated with different SAR year data and should have differences.
Table 8. Comparison of Cost Growth Factors
Program TCGFA IDA (TPCG) RAND(DE)
Year 1997 1993 1990
AGM-114HELLFIRE 1.458 1.44 1.47
LANCE 1.169 1.12 1.17
AH-64A 1.818 1.65 1.52
UH-60A 1.227 1.23 1.2
COPPERHEAD 1.861 2.12 1.65
Ml ABRAMS 1.792 1.4 1.52
BRADLEY 4.329 3.5 241
CH-47D 1.32 1.32 1.28




LONGBOW HELLFIRE 1.1 1.0
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This table is presented to add validity to the research results in this chapter. Even though
slightly different methodologies are used to calculate the cost growth factors, the majority of
the cost growth factors are very similar. The schedule data is not presented in this manner
because the schedule data for this analysis is extracted from the CTAT database, which has
been developed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This chapter provides a concise summary of the important aspects of this research.
This document begins by laying the groundwork that must be understood, in order, to fully
comprehend the results of the analysis. This groundwork includes providing information on
the three important elements of the DoD Acquisition Process, and then presenting an
argument for the importance of cycle time and cost research. Next, the cycle time and cost
methodology are presented, which explains how the cycle time and cost variables are
derived for the analyses in Chapters IV and V. The methodology also provides information
on previous theories and research conducted on this topic.
The theories and research on how program schedule growth affects program cost
growth do not always reach the same conclusions. Logic and common sense provide
theories that program cost should increase as program schedule increases. Research
conducted in 1962 found a correlation exists between program schedule growth and
program cost growth. However, research conducted by RAND and IDA on acquisition
programs, in the early 90s, does not identify a significant correlation between these two
important elements. The research conducted by RAND and IDA incorporates all categories
of acquisition programs procured by all four services. This type of research provides a
macro-view of cost trends and thus certain cost trends may not be visible at this level of
analysis. (Drezner, 1993) The RAND study recommends further research, using
homogeneous program groups to determine if this type of research provides the same results
as the DoD-wide analysis results.
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The objectives of this research are to determine the magnitude of cycle time growth
and cost growth for the selected Army programs. Once the cycle time and cost growth
trends are determined separately, a correlation analysis is conducted to explore if a
relationship exists between program cycle time growth and cost growth within a
homogeneous group of Army programs. Analysis of a homogeneous group of programs
may reveal schedule and cost relationships that are masked at the macro-level.
This chapter is divided into three sections; research conclusions, recommendation
based on research findings, and suggested areas for further research. The conclusions and
recommendations are intended to generate discussion on the need to further explore or
expand this research.
B. CONCLUSIONS
This section discusses the conclusions drawn from the results of this research
analysis. The conclusions are presented in three sections; changing acquisition
environment, Army Program cycle time and cost growth, and cycle time and cost growth
correlation.
1. Changing Acquisition Environment
The current DoD Acquisition Process must adapt to the new security and budgetary
environment. The three factors changing the acquisition environment are the change in
threat environment, a decreasing defense budget, and the need to modernize existing
weapon systems. These circumstances require the DoD to field new systems quickly and
upgrade existing equipment within the constraints of a significantiy reduced defense budget.
The current DoD Acquisition Process is structured to solve technical problems
based on a stable, known threat. However, the future battlefield has become fluid and
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complex, focusing on peacekeeping operations like Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, and Kosovo.
Today's United States military forces must be able to react to various threats by fielding
systems in a timely manner, before the threat shifts or changes.
To further compound the current situation of a changing threat and reduced budget,
the equipment and systems currently used by DoD soldiers are nearing the end of their
expected lifetime. These systems will soon need to be replaced with upgraded systems
incorporating the newest technology. The military services must be able to develop,
produce, and field these upgraded or new systems within the constraints of the reduced
defense budget and at an accelerated cycle time required to adapt to the ever-changing threat
environment.
2. Army Program Cycle Time and Cost Growth
This research demonstrates that Army programs are experiencing positive
cycle time growth. The overall average growth for full cycle programs is 19.6 months as
compared to the average modification program growth of 4.1 months. Phase II of the
Acquisition Process, EMD, demonstrates the highest average growth in both of the groups.
The full cycle group's Phase II average growth is 14.3 months and the modification group's
average growth is 9.2 months. The PGM commodity has the greatest average growth (51
months) in the full cycle group and the C3I commodity has the greatest average growth (9
months) in the modification group.
All of the full cycle commodities have a greater average program length than their
modification commodity counterparts. The full cycle program average length is 137.2
months or 1 1.4 years. The modification program average length is 69.6 months or 5.8 years.
Within the full cycle group, the PGM commodity has the greatest average length (166
105
months) and the Helicopter commodity has the greatest average length (84 months) in the
modification group.
Correlation analysis is conducted between program schedule growth and initial
program length estimate. There is no demonstrated correlation between these factors in the
full cycle programs; however, a strong correlation, r = -0.661, exists between these factors
for the modification programs. This is a significant result that demonstrates as the initial
length of modification programs increases, the amount of schedule growth decreases.
Further research should be conducted to determine reasons why the modification programs
demonstrate a strong correlation and the full cycle programs show no significant correlation.
This research reveals that Army programs are experiencing positive program cost
growth. Due to combined cost data in the SARs for modification programs, this research is
only able to determine the cost growth for the full cycle programs. The Army program
average cost growth, adjusted for quantity change, is 49.9%. This number compares very
closely with a DoD-wide average cost growth, adjusted for quantity of47% reported by
EDA in 1992. The 49.9% cost growth includes a development cost growth of 38.2%, and a
procurement cost growth of 52. 1 %.
Three of the five commodity groups have cost growth of almost 100%, with the
Vehicle commodity the greatest at 105.2%. The majority of the Vehicle and Helicopter
commodity average cost growth, adjusted for quantity, is due to the Bradley program and
the RAH-66 program, respectively. The Bradley program has an adjusted cost growth of
329%, and the RAH-66 program has an adjusted cost growth of 179%. The cost growth due
to schedule changes as reported in the SAR Section 13 variance categories is also analyzed.
The cost growth induced by schedule is only 14.3% of the overall cost growth adjusted for
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quantity, which is a relatively small part of the overall adjusted cost growth. This
percentage becomes even smaller when the cost growth is not adjusted for quantity.
Correlation analysis is conducted between the cost growth factors and other cost
related program issues. The relationship or association is analyzed between TCGFA and
STCGF, and the following program cost related issues:
• Initial Cost Estimate
• Year of Program Start
None of these simple correlation analyses demonstrate any significant relationship between
the examined variables.
3. Correlation Between Cycle Time and Cost Growth
The correlation analysis between cycle time and cost growth demonstrates that a
significant association exists between these two program factors. Using a homogeneous
group, Army programs that incorporated all of the acquisition milestones, this research
demonstrates a significant relationship between schedule growth and cost growth. Based on
the results of this research, the relationship between cost growth adjusted for quantity and
schedule growth is significant at the .01 level. This result means that if a program's
schedule increases then it is very likely that the program's cost also increases.
A multiple regression analysis is used to further explore the relationship between
schedule growth and cost growth. Since TCGFA demonstrated the highest correlation with
SGF in the simple regression, TCGFA is used as the base-case dependent variable in the
multiple regression analysis. The independent variables are the Ln (initial cost estimate in
1998 constant dollars), Ln (initial schedule estimate in months), and the Ln (current
schedule estimate in months). The log log form is used both because this form yields a
107
model with better statistical properties and identifies the effects of initial cost, initial
schedule, and current schedule on TCGFA. The log log form also enables the multiple
regression equation to be represented with an equation that includes both TCGFA and
schedule growth factor (SGF). The equation resulting from the multiple regression analysis
is presented below:
Ln(TCGFA) = -1.2 + .165*Ln(CostiN) + 1.29*Ln(SGF)
This equation demonstrates that if the initial program cost changes by 1% then the TCGFA
changes by a factor of . 165%, and that if the SGF changes by 1% then the TCGFA changes
by 1.29%. The coefficients in the regression equation are significant at the .05 level for
initial cost and at the .01 level for SGF.
As explained in Chapter V, this simple model has limitations that must be
understood. The model is based on a multiple regression analysis of only 19 data points.
This log log model also assumes that schedule growth occurs independently of other causes
of cost growth, which in the real world does not occur. This model is derived to better
understand the results of the simple correlation, and to provide an initial understanding of
the magnitude of the cost-schedule relationship. However, it must be used very carefully to
predict how an actual schedule change affects a program's actual final cost. A better
explanatory model should include all of the relevant variables that affect program cost
growth.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
This research demonstrates that a possible relationship exists between cycle time
growth and cost growth. Further research must be conducted to verify these results and then
continue to explore the effects of schedule growth on cost growth.
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1. Cost, Schedule, and Performance Relational Database
The first recommendation is to develop a relational database that incorporates the
three important factors associated with an acquisition program; cost, schedule, and
performance. This type of database would permit the analysis of the relationship among
these program factors. Understanding the interaction and relationship between these three
program factors, increases the accuracy of the initial program's cost and schedule estimates
based on a desired level of performance. Funding instability is a contributing factor to
program instability, which can lead to cost and schedule growth. Some of the funding
instability occurs because of inaccurate initial cost estimates. Increasing acquisition
program stability could be a secondary effect of accurate initial cost and schedule estimates.
One important component of the required work to develop this type of database
already exists in the form of the CTAT. This tool could be initially merged with a cost
database and then the performance data could be added when it becomes available. This
type of research is currently being conducted at OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation
(PA&E). The PA&E personnel are in the initial stages of developing a program cost
database for MSII to MSHI. Instead of using baseline estimates (PE, DE, and PdE), this
database will be based on cost estimates at the various Defense Acquisition Process
Milestones. Future PA&E plans are to incorporate the program schedule information. At
present there are no plans to incorporate the performance data. (Pannullo, 1999)
2. Incorporate Software Cost in the SAR
The second recommendation is that the next SAR update should include a software
cost variance category in SAR Section 13. The DoD weapons systems reliance on software
continues to grow and software has become and increasingly evident problem in program
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management. "When a major procurement programs turn into a fiasco, when costs soar,
deliveries fall behind schedule, and performance is compromised, more times than not the
problem can be traced to one high-risk component—the software (Software Technology
Support Center, 1996, p. 1-5)". In June 1992, an Air Force Software Process Action Team
reported that one of the three top problem areas in software program development is the
program acquisition baseline. Usually the schedule estimate is understated. (Software
Technology Support Center, 1996) Incorporating program software data into the SARs is a
viable method of tracking the effects of software development across all acquisition
programs.
3. Reform Initiatives
Based on the results of this research, future acquisition reform initiatives should
target cycle time reduction and cost reduction separately. This course of action is
recommended because only 14.3% of adjusted cost growth, as reported in the SAR, is
attributed to schedule. Acquisition reform initiatives should address cycle time reduction
due to the changing threat environment. Cost reduction should be addressed because of the
austere fiscal environment that is exacerbated by the increasing necessity to modernize the
military's existing equipment. This research demonstrates that reform initiatives that reduce
cycle time will provide the added benefit of a small decrease in cost growth.
However, further research needs to be conducted on the accuracy of the allocation of
schedule induced cost growth to the schedule cost variance. If further research demonstrates
that the schedule induced cost growth is misallocated and that the percentage of cost growth
due to schedule is higher, then acquisition reform initiatives should have a different
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objective. In this case, reform initiatives should target cycle time reduction in order to field
systems quickly, with a secondary objective of significantly reducing the program cost.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
• Theoretical analysis on combining the hypothesized program development cost curve
with the hypothesized production cost curve. Combining these two curves results in a
total cost curve for the program.
• This research analyzes the affect of program schedule growth on program cost growth.
Further research should be conducted on the relationship between development schedule
growth and development cost growth. This type of analysis would also provide
additional insight on the hypothesized development cost curve.
• Further research could be conducted on the relationship between production schedule
growth and production cost growth. This type of analysis would also provide additional
insight on the hypothesized production cost curve.
• This research demonstrates that a schedule and cost growth relationship exists for one
homogeneous program group. This result should be explored with other homogeneous
program groups. Research should be conducted on Air Force programs, Navy
programs, aircraft programs, vehicle programs, etc...
• Compare and contrast the current DoD Acquisition Process to the principles
incorporated in lean manufacturing to determine whether the principles are applicable to
the DoD and what would be their impact on program cost and schedule.
• Conduct an analysis on software induced program schedule and cost growth. What is
the magnitude of this software induced program growth? How has this affect changed
over time? Which of the current SAR cost variance categories is the software affect
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allocated? Should software induced cost growth be a cost variance category in the
SAR?
• Compare the development of the Boeing 777 to the Army RAH-66 program. Compare
and contrast the differences in the management processes. What lessons learned from
the Boeing development are applicable to the RAH-66 program? What lessons learned
are generally applicable to all acquisition programs?
• Use the analysis in this research and focus on the schedule cost growth paradox. Why
does TCGFA have a higher correlation to schedule growth than the STCGF? One can
hypothesize that some schedule induced cost growth is misallocated to other cost
variance categories.
• Use the analysis in this research and focus on the reasons for schedule and cost growth.
What are the significant reasons that account for schedule and cost growth? Do current
acquisition reform initiatives address the reasons for this growth?
• Research the affects of acquisition reform initiatives since 1960. As this study
demonstrates, there is little correlation between year of program start and cycle time
growth and cost growth. This means that the magnitude of program cycle time and cost
growth is not being reduced. Explore the acquisition reform initiatives, over this time
period, to determine why program cost growth and cycle time growth is not being
reduced. Also, compare and contrast any earlier reform initiatives with the current
acquisition reform initiatives. Will the current set of acquisition reform initiatives have
an impact on reducing cycle time and cost growth?
• This research explored the relationship between schedule growth and cost growth
adjusted for quantity, which included the secondary effects of quantity change on
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schedule. Building on these results, further research could explore the impact of
performance and quantity change's secondary affects on schedule induced cost growth.
The following model could be used as a start point.
Quantity Change
Performance Change
Figure 34. Factors that Affect Cost Growth
The boxed line indicates the scope of the research conducted in this analysis. This thesis
adjusts cost growth to account for the affects of quantity volume change; however, this
research does not directly estimate the affects of quantity volume change. Research should
also explore the primary effects (black lines) of quantity change and performance change on
cost growth. Then the secondary affects on schedule induced cost growth (dashed lines) and
the resulting impact on cost growth could be determined.
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ACRONYMS
ACAT - Acquisition Category
ADM - Acquisition Defense Memorandum
APB - Acquisition Program Baseline
ARSSG - Acquisition Reform Senior Steering Group
ASD(C) - Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller
ASD (C3I) - Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)
BES - Budget Estimate Submissions
C3I - Command, Control, Communication & Intelligence
CAE - Component Acquisition Executive
CE - Concept Exploration
CIO - Chief Information Officer
CJCS - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CTAT - Cycle Time Analysis Tool
DAB - Defense Acquisition Board
DCGF - Development Cost Growth Factor
DCGFA - Development Cost Growth Factor Adjusted
DE - Development Estimate
DEV - Development
DoD - Department of Defense
DPG - Defense Planing Guidance
DSAC - Defense System Affordability Council
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DT - Developmental Testing
EMD - Engineering & Manufacturing Development
FASA - Federal Acquisition Streamlining ACT
FSD - Full Scale Development
FYDP - Future Years Defense Program
GAO - General Accounting Office
IDA - Institute for Defense Analysis
IOC - Initial Operational Capability
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
LCC - Life Cycle Cost
LRIP - Low Rate Initial Production
MAA - Mission Area Assessment
MAIS - Major Automated Information Systems
MDA - Milestone Decision Authority
MDAP - Major Defense Acquisition Program
MNS - Mission Need Statement
MS - Milestone
NCA - National Command Authority
NMS - National Military Strategy
NPR - National Performance Review
NSC - National Security Council
NSS - National Security Strategy
O & M - Operations and Maintenance
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OMB - Office of Management and Budget
ORD - Operational Requirements Document
OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense
OT - Operational Testing
PA&E - Program Analysis and Evaluation
PCGF - Procurement Cost Growth Factor
PCGFA - Procurement Cost Growth Factor Adjusted
PdE - Production Estimate
PDRR - Program Definition & Risk Reduction
PE - Planning Estimate
PGM - Precision Guided Munitions
PM - Program Manager
PMO - Program Management Office
POM - Program Objectives Memoranda
PPBS - Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PROC - Procurement
QDR - Quadrennial Defense Review
RDT&E - Research, Development, Test & Evaluation
RMA - Revolution in Military Affairs
SAR - Selected Acquisition Reports
SDCGF - Schedule induced Development Cost Growth Factor
SPCGF - Schedule induced Procurement Cost Growth Factor
STCGF - Schedule induced Total Cost Growth Factor
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TCGF - Total Cost Growth Factor
TCGFA - Total Cost Growth Factor Adjusted
TEMP - Test & Evaluation Master Plan
TOA - Total Obligation Authority
USD(A&T) - Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)
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APPENDIX A: CYCLE TIME DATA TABLES
This appendix provides the cycle time data in table format. The first two tables in
this appendix represent the cycle time data condensed into summary tables for full cycle
programs and modification programs. These are the tables used to generate the cycle time
figures in Chapter IV. The tables from page 122 to 131 represent the raw cycle time data in
date format as extracted from the CTAT database. The tables from page 132 to 141
represent the same raw cycle time data; however, the data has been converted to months.
These tables are also extracted from the CTAT database.
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Table Al. Full Cycle Program Summary Cycle Time Data
Growth Grew ill Growth Growth Procnim »
Procnun Name MSI- Orr E-.I % MS 11- Ore Est * Msni
.
Ctr Est * Pro Sn - Or?Ey % LCTirih of
MS 1! Growth MS 111 Growth IOC Growth IOC Growth Prosrsms
AAWS-M (JAVALIN) 37 0.00* 35 60 58.33* -25 IS -138 89* 10 115 8.70* 125 5
AG.M-114IHELLFIRE) 38 000% 4 69 580* 34 IS 18SS9* 38 125 30 40* 163
LANCE 59 0.00* 5 32 15 63* • 5 22 -22.73* 113 000* 113
LONGBOW HELLF1RE 64 ooo* 10 72 13 89* 5 4 125 00* 15 140 1071* 155
ATACMS/APAM 94 0.00* 14 43 32 56* -12 9 133.334 2 146 1.37* 148
TOTAL (1 "92 000* 68 276 126* -3 71 IS 94* 65 639 51 18* 704
AVERAGE 58 4 0.00* 136 552 25* -0.6 14.2 3 79* 13 127 8 10.24* 1408
C3I
AEATDS 2 62 3.23* 18 57 31.58* 4 9 44 44* 24 128 18.75* 152 5
ANHTC-W 22 00* -8 83 9 64* 32 3200 00* 24 105 22.86* 12"
CHANNEL ANTI-JAM 5 o oo<; -15 45 -33.33* 15 22 68.18* 72 000* 72
LONGBOW AH-64 5 59 8.47* 12 46 26.09* 12 24 50.00* 29 129 22.48* 158
SMART-T 15 00* 1 77 1.30* -1 14 -7.14% 106 00<J. 106
TOTAL 7 163 11.70* - 308 15 99'; 62 69 3355* 77 540 64 09* 617
AVERAGE
HELICOPTERS
1 4 326 2.34* 1 6 61.6 320* 124 13.8 671* 15.4 108 12.82* 123 4
AH-64 1 50 2.00* 16 47 34.04* 52 0.00* 17 149 11.41* 166 4
COMANCHE 1 43 32 134.38* -9 59 -15.25* 1 IK 1% 34 92 36.96* N/A
COMANCHE 2 48 112 42.86* A 61 -6.56* 3 2 150 00* 47 175 2nS6* 222
UH-60 14 000* 30 56 53 57* -25 26 -96 15* 5 % 5 21* 10!




23 52 44.81* 8.25 55.75 16.45* -5.5 20.25 1346% 25.75 128 2011* 163
75 0.00* 53 67 79.10* 3 13 23 08* 56 155 36.13* 211 3
COPPERHEAD 21 0.00* 49 53 'i2 45'; -12 -1200 00% 37 74 50 00% 111
SADARM 40 o.oo* 54 75 7200* 6 1 600 00* 60 116 51.72* 176
TOTAL 136 0.00* 156 195 243.56* 3 14 .577* 153 345 137.85* 498
AVERAGE
VEHICLES
45.33 0.00* 52 65 81.19* -1 00 4 67 -192* 51 115 45.95* 166
CRUSADER .5 76 -6.58* 5 66 -7.58* • 18 16 -112.50* -28 158 -1772% 130 4
Ml ABRAMS 48 0.00* 8 51 15.69* -7 .-> -350 00* 1 97 1 03* 98
M1CV BRADLEY 7 000* 86 0.00* 15 30 50 00* 15 123 [£20* 138
PLS (FHTV) 12 0.00* 32 23 139 13* -7 21 -33.33* 25 56 44 64* 81
TOTAL -5 141 -6.58* 35 226 147 24* -17 65 -445 S3* 13 434 40 15* 447
AVERAGE -1.25 IS 7S I 64* 8.75 56.5 36.81* -1.25 16.25 -111 46* 325 108.5 10 04* 111 75
OVERALL TOTAL 94 942 184* 300 1228 599* 17 300 2406* 411 2470 374% 2881
OVERAIJ. AVERAGE 4.48 44.86 8.78% 14.29 58.48 28.SI* 0.81 14.29 114.55% l-»_57 117.62 17*)% 137.190476
NUM OF PROGRAMS :i
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Table A2. Modification Program Summary Cycle Time Data
( jn ruth Growth Growth Growth fauna « Rry
Program Name MS1- or <« MSD- Or % MS III - Or)! % ProSrt- Ore % LcnLth * SAR
msd Est Growth Msm Ea Growth IOC Est Growth 10C Est Growth Proeranrs lex-
AGM-1I4HELLFIRE N/A N/A N/A 46 0.00% 1« 000% 65 000% ' ]«;
ATACMS/APAM BL 1A N;A N/A N/A 14 35 40.00% 14 13 -107 69% 48 0.00% 48 1983
STINGER RMP N/A N/A N/A 1 41 2.44% 11 9 122.22% 12 50 24 00% 62 1993
TOTAL N/A N/A N/A 15 122 42 44% -3 41 14.53% 12 163 24 00% 175
AVERAGE N/A N/A N/A 5.00 40.67 14.15% -100 13.67 4.84% 4.00 54.33 8.00% 58"
^^^^(5^^^^^^|
ASAS BL D N/A N/A N/A 19 58 32.76% -51 57 -89 47% -3: 115 -27.83% 83 1991
MCS BLIH N/A N/A N/A 60 8 75000% -10 12 -83.33% 50 20 250 00% 70 ;"-i
TOTAL N/A N/A N/A 79 66 78276% -61 69 -172.81% 18 135 22217% :-•
AVERAGE N/A N/A N/A 39.5 33 391.38% -30.5 34.5 -86.40% 9 67 5 111.09% 76.5
HELICOPTERS
CH-47D N/A N/A N/A I 59 1.69% -1 41 -2.44% 100 000% 100
KJOWA WARRIOR N/A N/A N/A 4 45 8.89% 6 13 46.15% 10 58 1724% 6* 1982 |
TOTALj N/A N/A N/A 5 104 10.58% 5 54 43.71% 10 158 17.24% 168
AVERAGE N/A N/A N/A 25 52 5.29% 25 27 21.86% 5 79 862% 84
^^^^K^Nl^^^^^M
ATACMSBATP3I 7 53 13.2% -3 47 -6.38% -8 12 -66.67% -4 112 -3.57% 108 1 1994
ATACMS BAT BLOCK DA N/A N/A N/A 10 47 21 28% -12 15 -80 00% -2 62 -3.23% 60 1994
ATACMS BAT BLOCK D N/A N/A N/A 8 64 12.50% 4 400.00% 12 64 IS ""5% 76 1994
TOTAL 7 53 13.21% 15 158 27.39% -16 27 25333% 6 238 11.95% 244
AVERAGE 7 53 13.21% 5 52.67 9.13% •5.33 9 84 44'-, 2 7933 3.98% 8i ->
^^^^^hicli^^^^T(
BFVS/A3 UPGRADE N/A N/A N/A 1 69 1.45% 3 6 50 00% 4 75 5.33% 79 4 1993
M1AI N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 20 00% 20 000% 20 1987
M1A2 N/A N/A N/A 5 32 15.63% -2 19 -10.53% 3 51 588% 54 1990
M1A2 UPGRADE N/A N/A N/A 64 000% 4 14 28.57% 4 78 5.13% 82 1993
TOTAL N/A N/A N/A 6 165 17.07% 5 59 68.05% 11 224 16.34% 235
AVERAGE N/A N/A N/A ZOO 55.00 5.69% 1.25 1475 17.01% 275 56 409% 5875
I
OVERALL TOTAL 7 53 13-21% 120 615 880.25% 1 -70 250 206^2% I 57 918 291.71% 975






4.07 65.57 20*1% 69.6 |
# PROGRAMS .4 13
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Table A3. CTAT Raw Cycle Time Data
























SMART-T - 12-01-1992 NS 02-1991 05-1992 10-1998 12-1999
SMART-T - 12-01-1993 NS 02-1991 05-1992 10-1998 12-1999
SMART-T - 12-01-1994 NS 02-1991 05-1992 10-1998 12-1999
SMART-T - 12-01-1995 NS 02-1991 05-1992 10-1998 12-1999
SMART-T - 12-01-1996 NS 02-1991 05-1992 10-1998 12-1999
SMART-T - 12-01-1997 NS 02-1991 05-1992 11-1998 12-1999
Longbow Apache - 12-01-1989 NS 08-1985 07-1990 05-1994 05-1996
Longbow Apache - 12-01-1990 NS 08-1985 12-1990 12-1996 04-1997
Longbow Apache - 12-01-1991 NS 08-1985 12-1990 10-1996 04-1997
Longbow Apache - 12-01-1992 NS 08-1985 12-1990 10-1997 12-1997
Longbow Apache - 12-01-1993 NS 08-1985 12-1990 11-1995 12-1997
Longbow Apache - 12-01-1994 NS 08-1985 12-1990 10-1995 12-1997
Longbow Apache - 12-01-1995 NS 08-1985 12-1990 10-1995 12-1997
Longbow Apache - 12-01-1996 NS 08-1985 12-1990 10-1995 10-1998
Longbow Apache - 12-01-1997 NS 08-1985 12-1990 10-1995 10-1998
12-01-1990 NS 05-1984 07-1989 04-1994 01-1995
12-01-1991 NS 05-1984 07-1989 06-1994 09-1995
12-01-1992 NS 05-1984 07-1989 06-1994 09-1995
12-01-1993 NS 05-1984 07-1989 12-1994 12-1995
12-01-1994 NS 05-1984 07-1989 11-1995 07-1996
12-01-1995 NS 05-1984 07-1989 12-1995 08-1996
12-01-1996 NS 05-1984 09-1989 12-1995 01-1997
12-01-1997 NS 05-1984 09-1989 12-1995 01-1997
12-01-1974 NS 06-1972 04-1974 03-1981 03-1981
12-01-1975 NS 06-1972 04-1974 08-1981 08-1981
12-01-1976 NS 06-1972 04-1974 12-1982 06-1982
12-01-1977 NS 06-1972 04-1974 12-1982 06-1982
12-01-1978 NS 06-1972 04-1974 10-1981 06-1982
12-01-1979 NS 06-1972 04-1974 10-1981 12-1982
12-01-1980 NS 06-1972 04-1974 07-1980 02-1983
12-01-1981 NS 06-1972 04-1974 07-1980 03-1983
12-01-1982 NS 06-1972 04-1974 07-1980 03-1983
12-01-1983 NS 06-1972 04-1974 07-1980 03-1983
12-01-1984 NS 06-1972 04-1974 07-1980 03-1983
12-01-1992 NS 12-1991 05-1992 02-1996 12-1997
12-01-1993 NS 12-1991 05-1992 02-1996 12-1997
12-01-1994 NS 12-1991 05-1992 11-1994 12-1997
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Table A4. CTAT Raw Cycle Time Data
ProgramName Mod/NS Doc Date Status MSI MSII MSIIIb END
HELICOPTERS
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1973 NS 09-1972 05-1976 TBD 02-1985
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1974 NS 09-1972 11-1976 TBD TBD
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1975 NS 09-1972 11-1976 10-1980 02-1985
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1976 NS 09-1972 12-1976 05-1980 09-1984
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1977 NS 09-1972 12-1976 11-1980 03-1985
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1978 NS 09-1972 12-1976 11-1980 03-1985
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1979 NS 09-1972 12-1976 11-1981 03-1986
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1980 NS 09-1972 12-1976 12-1981 01-1985
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1981 NS 09-1972 12-1976 03-1982 07-1985
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1982 NS 09-1972 12-1976 03-1 982 07-1985
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1983 NS 09-1972 12-1976 03-1982 08-1985
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1984 NS 09-1972 12-1976 03-1982 04-1986
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1985 NS 09-1972 12-1976 03-1982 08-1986
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1986 NS 09-1972 12-1976 03-1 982 07-1986
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1987 NS 09-1972 12-1976 03-1982 07-1986
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1988 NS 09-1972 12-1976 03-1982 07-1986
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1989 NS 09-1972 12-1976 03-1982 07-1986
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1990 NS 09-1972 12-1976 03-1982 07-1986
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1991 NS 09-1972 12-1976 03-1982 07-1986
AH-64 (Apache) 12-01-1992 NS 09-1972 12-1976 03-1 982 07-1986
RAH-66 (Comanche) 12-01-1985 NS 06-1987 06-1987 11-1995 05-1996
RAH-66 (Comanche) 12-01-1986 NS 06-1987 06-1987 11-1995 11-1995
RAH-66 (Comanche) 12-01-1987 NS 04-1988 12-1990 11-1995 12-1995
RAH-66 (Comanche) 12-01-1988 NS 06-1988 12-1990 11-1996 11-1996
RAH-66 (Comanche) 12-01-1989 NS 06-1988 12-1990 11-1996 12-1996
RAH-66 (Comanche) 12-01-1990 NS 06-1988 09-1994 11-1998 12-1998
RAH-66 (Comanche) 12-01-1991 NS 06-1988 TBD TBD TBD
RAH-66 (Comanche) 12-01-1992 NS 06-1988 10-1997 11-2002 01-2003
RAH-66 (Comanche) 12-01-1993 NS 06-1988 10-1997 11-2002 01-2003
RAH-66 (Comanche) 12-01-1994 NS 06-1988 10-2001 07-2006 07-2006
RAH-66 (Comanche) 12-01-1995 NS 06-1988 10-2001 07-2006 07-2006
RAH-66 (Comanche) 12-01-1996 NS 06-1988 10-2001 07-2006 07-2006
RAH-66 (Comanche) 12-01-1997 NS 06-1988 10-2001 07-2006 12-2006
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 12-01-1972 NS 06-1971 08-1972 04-1 977 06-1979
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 12-01-1973 NS 06-1971 08-1972 04-1977 06-1979
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 12-01-1974 NS 06-1971 10-1976 02-1979 06-1979
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 12-01-1975 NS 06-1971 08-1972 08-1979 08-1979
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 12-01-1976 NS 06-1971 08-1972 08-1979 08-1979
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 12-01-1977 NS 06-1971 08-1972 08-1979 08-1979
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 12-01-1978 NS 06-1971 08-1972 09-1979 08-1979
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 12-01-1979 NS 06-1971 08-1972 10-1979 11-1979
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 12-01-1980 NS 06-1971 08-1972 10-1979 11-1979
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 12-01-1981 NS 06-1971 08-1972 10-1979 11-1979
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Table A5. CTAT Raw Cycle Time Data
ProgramName Mod/NS Doc Date Status MSI MSII MSIIIb END
PGM
ATACMS - BAT BAT 12-01-1991 NS 02-1985 05-1991 12-1996 01-1998
ATACMS - BAT BAT 12-01-1992 NS 02-1985 05-1991 11-1998 01-2000
ATACMS - BAT BAT 12-01-1993 NS 02-1985 05-1991 11-1998 01-2000
ATACMS - BAT BAT 12-01-1994 NS 02-1985 05-1991 09-2000 07-2002
ATACMS - BAT BAT 12-01-1995 NS 02-1985 05-1991 09-2000 07-2002
ATACMS - BAT BAT 12-01-1996 NS 02-1985 05-1991 09-2000 07-2002
ATACMS - BAT BAT 12-01-1997 NS 02-1985 05-1991 05-2001 09-2002
COPPERHEAD . 12-01-1975 NS 09-1973 06-1975 11-1979 11-1979
COPPERHEAD - 12-01-1976 NS 09-1973 06-1975 04-1980 05-1980
COPPERHEAD - 12-01-1977 NS 09-1973 06-1975 09-1980 09-1980
COPPERHEAD - 12-01-1978 NS 09-1973 06-1975 12-1980 03-1981
COPPERHEAD - 12-01-1979 NS 09-1973 06-1975 NA 11-1981
COPPERHEAD - 12-01-1980 NS 09-1973 06-1975 NA 11-1981
COPPERHEAD - 12-01-1981 NS 09-1973 06-1975 NA 04-1982
COPPERHEAD - 12-01-1982 NS 09-1973 06-1975 NA 12-1982
COPPERHEAD - 12-01-1983 NS 09-1973 06-1975 NA 12-1982
COPPERHEAD - 12-01-1984 NS 09-1973 06-1975 NA 12-1982
COPPERHEAD - 12-01-1985 NS 09-1973 06-1975 NA 12-1982
COPPERHEAD - 12-01-1986 NS 09-1973 06-1975 NA 12-1982
COPPERHEAD - 12-01-1987 NS 09-1973 06-1975 NA 12-1982
COPPERHEAD - 12-01-1988 NS 09-1973 06-1975 12-1983 12-1982
SADARM . 12-01-1991 NS 11-1984 03-1988 06-1994 07-1994
SADARM - 12-01-1992 NS 11-1984 03-1988 06-1995 09-1995
SADARM - 12-01-1993 NS 11-1984 03-1988 09-1997 03-1998
SADARM - 12-01-1994 NS 11-1984 03-1988 12-1998 07-1999
SADARM - 12-01-1995 NS 11-1984 03-1988 12-1998 07-1999
SADARM - 12-01-1996 NS 11-1984 03-1988 12-1998 07-1999
SADARM - 12-01-1997 NS 11-1984 03-1988 12-1998 07-1999
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Table A6. CTAT Raw Cycle Time Data
ProgramName Mod/NS Doc Date Status MSI MSII MSIIIb END
TACTICAL MISSILE
AAWS-M (Javelin) - 12-01-1989 NS 05-1986 06-1989 06-1994 12-1995
AAWS-M (Javelin) - 12-01-1990 NS 05-1986 06-1989 06-1994 12-1995
AAWS-M (Javelin) - 12-01-1991 NS 05-1986 06-1989 04-1996 01-1997
AAWS-M (Javelin) - 12-01-1992 NS 05-1 986 06-1989 04-1996 01-1997
AAWS-M (Javelin) - 12-01-1993 NS 05-1986 06-1989 01-1996 01-1997
AAWS-M (Javelin) - 12-01-1994 NS 05-1986 06-1989 NA 08-1996
AAWS-M (Javelin) - 12-01-1995 NS 05-1986 06-1989 NA 08-1996
AAWS-M (Javelin) - 12-01-1996 NS 05-1986 06-1989 NA 10-1996
AAWS-M (Javelin) - 12-01-1997 NS 05-1 986 06-1989 05-1997 10-1996
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1976 NS 12-1972 02-1976 11-1981 05-1983
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1977 NS 12-1972 02-1976 01-1982 11-1983
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1978 NS 12-1972 02-1976 01-1982 11-1983
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1979 NS 12-1972 02-1976 NA 10-1984
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1980 NS 12-1972 02-1976 NA 01-1985
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1981 NS 12-1972 02-1976 NA 07-1985
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1982 NS 12-1972 02-1976 03-1982 07-1985
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1983 NS 12-1972 02-1976 03-1982 07-1985
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1984 NS 12-1972 02-1976 03-1982 04-1986
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1985 NS 12-1972 02-1976 03-1 982 08-1986
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1986 NS 12-1972 02-1976 03-1982 07-1986
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1987 NS 12-1972 02-1976 03-1982 07-1986
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1988 NS 12-1972 02-1976 03-1982 07-1986
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1989 NS 12-1972 02-1976 03-1982 07-1986
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1990 NS 12-1972 02-1976 03-1 982 07-1986
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1991 NS 12-1972 02-1976 03-1982 07-1986
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1992 NS 12-1972 02-1976 03-1982 07-1986
AGM-114(Hellfire) - 12-01-1993 NS 12-1972 02-1976 03-1982 07-1986
ATACMS/APAM Block I 12-01-1985 NS 04-1978 02-1986 NA 06-1990
ATACMS/APAM Block I 12-01-1986 NS 04-1 978 02-1986 09-1989 06-1990
ATACMS/APAM Block I 12-01-1987 NS 04-1978 02-1986 09-1989 06-1990
ATACMS/APAM Block I 12-01-1988 NS 04-1978 02-1986 02-1990 07-1990
ATACMS/APAM Block I 12-01-1989 NS 04-1978 02-1986 09-1990 09-1990
ATACMS/APAM Block I 12-01-1990 NS 04-1978 02-1986 11-1990 08-1990
ATACMS/APAM Block I 12-01-1991 NS 04-1978 02-1986 11-1990 08-1990
ATACMS/APAM Block I 12-01-1992 NS 04-1978 02-1986 11-1990 08-1990
ATACMS/APAM Block I 12-01-1993 NS 04-1978 02-1986 11-1990 08-1990
ATACMS/APAM Block I 12-01-1994 NS 04-1978 02-1986 11-1990 08-1990
ATACMS/APAM Block I 12-01-1995 NS 04-1978 02-1986 11-1990 08-1990
LANCE . 12-01-1969 NS 01-1963 12-1967 08-1970 06-1972
LANCE - 12-01-1970 NS 01-1963 12-1967 01-1971 06-1972
LANCE - 12-01-1971 NS 01-1963 12-1967 01-1971 06-1972
LANCE - 12-01-1972 NS 01-1963 12-1967 01-1971 06-1972
LANCE - 12-01-1973 NS 01-1963 12-1967 01-1971 06-1972
LANCE - 12-01-1974 NS 01-1963 12-1967 01-1971 06-1972
LANCE - 12-01-1975 NS 01-1963 12-1967 04-1971 06-1972
LANCE - 12-01-1976 NS 01-1963 12-1967 01-1971 06-1972
LANCE - 12-01-1977 NS 01-1963 12-1967 01-1971 06-1972
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Doc Date Status MSI MSII MSIIIb END
12-01-1990 NS 08-1985 12-1990 12-1996 04-1997
02-01-1991 NS 08-1985 12-1990 12-1996 04-1997
12-01-1992 NS 08-1985 12-1990 12-1997 01-1998
12-01-1993 NS 08-1985 12-1990 12-1997 01-1998
12-01-1994 NS 08-1985 12-1990 12-1997 01-1998
12-01-1995 NS 08-1985 12-1990 10-1995 12-1997
12-01-1996 NS 08-1985 12-1990 10-1995 07-1998
12-01-1997 NS 08-1985 12-1990 10-1997 07-1998
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Table A8. CTAT Raw Cycle Time Data
ProgramName Mod/NS Doc Date Status MSI MSII MSIIIb END
VEHICLES
Crusader - 12-01-1994 NS 11-1994 NA 09-2006 01-2008
Crusader - 12-01-1995 NS 11-1994 NA 09-2006 01-2008
Crusader - 12-01-1996 NS 11-1994 03-2001 09-2006 01-2008
Crusader - 12-01-1997 NS 11-1994 10-2000 11-2005 09-2005
M1 Abrams M1 12-01-1978 NS 11-1972 11-1976 02-1981 12-1980
M1 Abrams M1 12-01-1979 NS 11-1972 11-1976 06-1981 12-1980
M1 Abrams M1 12-01-1980 NS 11-1972 11-1976 10-1981 01-1981
M1 Abrams M1 12-01-1981 NS 11-1972 11-1976 10-1981 01-1981
M1 Abrams M1 12-01-1982 NS 11-1972 11-1976 10-1981 01-1981
M1 Abrams M1 12-01-1983 NS 11-1972 11-1976 10-1981 01-1981
M1 Abrams M1 12-01-1984 NS 11-1972 11-1976 10-1981 01-1981
M1 Abrams M1 12-01-1985 NS 11-1972 11-1976 10-1981 01-1981
M1 Abrams M1 12-01-1986 NS 11-1972 11-1976 10-1981 01-1981
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1973 NS 04-1972 11-1972 NA 08-1978
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1974 NS 04-1972 11-1972 NA 03-1979
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1975 NS 04-1972 11-1972 NA 11-1979
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1976 NS 04-1972 11-1972 NA 07-1982
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1977 NS 04-1972 11-1972 NA 07-1982
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1978 NS 04-1972 11-1972 01-1980 07-1982
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1979 NS 04-1972 11-1972 01-1980 10-1982
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1980 NS 04-1972 11-1972 01-1980 10-1982
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1981 NS 04-1972 11-1972 01-1980 10-1983
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1982 NS 04-1972 11-1972 01-1980 10-1983
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1983 NS 04-1972 11-1972 01-1980 10-1983
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1984 NS 04-1972 11-1972 01-1980 10-1983
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1985 NS 04-1972 11-1972 01-1980 10-1983
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1986 NS 04-1972 11-1972 01-1980 10-1983
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1987 NS 04-1972 11-1972 01-1980 10-1983
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1988 NS 04-1972 11-1972 01-1980 10-1983
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1989 NS 04-1972 11-1972 01-1980 10-1983
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1990 NS 04-1972 11-1972 01-1980 10-1983
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1991 NS 04-1972 11-1972 01-1980 10-1983
MICV (Bradley) - 12-01-1992 NS 04-1972 11-1972 01-1980 10-1983
PLS (FHTV) . 12-01-1988 NS 05-1987 05-1988 04-1990 01-1992
PLS (FHTV) - 12-01-1989 NS 05-1987 05-1988 03-1992 04-1992
PLS (FHTV) - 12-01-1990 NS 05-1987 05-1988 08-1992 10-1992
PLS (FHTV) - 12-01-1991 NS 05-1987 05-1988 11-1992 02-1993
PLS (FHTV) - 12-01-1992 NS 05-1987 05-1988 12-1992 09-1993
PLS (FHTV) - 12-01-1993 NS 05-1987 05-1988 12-1992 03-1994
PLS (FHTV) - 12-01-1994 NS 05-1987 05-1988 12-1992 02-1994
PLS (FHTV) - 12-01-1995 NS 05-1987 05-1988 12-1992 02-1994
PLS (FHTV) - 12-01-1996 NS 05-1987 05-1988 12-1992 02-1994
127
Table A9. CTAT Raw Cycle Time Data (Modifications)
ProgramName Mod/NS Doc Date Status MSI MSII MSIIIb END
VEHICLES
BFVS/A3 Upgrade A3 Upgrade 12-01-1993 Mod NA 01-1994 10-1999 04-2000
BFVS/A3 Upgrade A3 Upgrade 12-01-1994 Mod NA 01-1994 11-1999 08-2000
BFVS/A3 Upgrade A3 Upgrade 12-01-1995 Mod NA 01-1994 11-1999 08-2000
BFVS/A3 Upgrade A3 Upgrade 12-01-1996 Mod NA 01-1994 11-1999 06-2000
BFVS/A3 Upgrade A3 Upgrade 12-01-1997 Mod NA 01-1994 11-1999 08-2000
M1 Abrams M1A1 12-01-1987 Mod NA NA 04-1985 12-1986
M1 Abrams M1A1 12-01-1988 Mod NA NA 04-1985 12-1986
M1 Abrams M1A1 12-01-1989 Mod NA NA 04-1985 12-1986
M1 Abrams M1A2 12-02-1988 Mod NA 12-1988 08-1991 03-1993
M1 Abrams M1A2 12-02-1989 Mod NA 12-1988 01-1992 06-1993
M1 Abrams M1A2 12-01-1990 Mod NA 12-1988 01-1992 06-1993
M1 Abrams M1A2 12-01-1991 Mod NA 12-1988 NA 02-1993
M1 Abrams UPGRADE 12-02-1992 Mod NA 12-1988 04-1994 06-1995
M1 Abrams UPGRADE 12-01-1993 Mod NA 12-1988 04-1994 06-1995
M1 Abrams UPGRADE 12-01-1994 Mod NA 12-1988 04-1994 06-1995
M1 Abrams UPGRADE 12-01-1995 Mod NA 12-1988 04-1994 10-1995
M1 Abrams UPGRADE 12-01-1996 Mod NA 12-1988 04-1994 10-1995
M1 Abrams UPGRADE 12-01-1997 Mod NA 12-1988 04-1994 10-1995
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Table A10. CTAT Raw Cycle Time Data (Modifications)
ProgramName Mod/NS Doc Date Status MSI MSII MSIIIb END
PGM
ATACMS •BAT BAT P3I 12-04-1994 Mod 10-1993 03-1998 02-2002 02-2003
ATACMS BAT BAT P3I 12-04-1995 Mod 10-1993 03-1998 02-2002 02-2003
ATACMS •BAT BAT P3I 12-04-1996 Mod 10-1993 10-1998 06-2002 02-2003
ATACMS BAT BAT P3I 12-04-1997 Mod 10-1993 10-1998 06-2002 10-2002
ATACMS •BAT Block II 12-02-1994 Mod NA 05-1995 09-2000 09-2000
ATACMS BAT Block II 12-02-1995 Mod NA 05-1995 09-2000 09-2000
ATACMS
•
•BAT Block II 12-02-1996 Mod NA 05-1990 09-2000 09-2000
ATACMS BAT Block II 12-02-1997 Mod NA 05-1995 05-2001 09-2001
ATACMS BAT Block IIA 12-03-1994 Mod NA 03-1998 02-2002 05-2003
ATACMS BAT Block IIA 12-03-1995 Mod NA 04-1998 02-2002 05-2003
ATACMS BAT Block IIA 12-03-1996 Mod NA 03-1999 12-2003 03-2004
ATACMS BAT Block IIA 12-03-1997 Mod NA 03-1999 12-2003 03-2004
C3I
ASAS Block II 12-02-1991 Mod NA 01-1993 11-1997 08-2002
ASAS Block II 12-02-1992 Mod NA 08-1993 07-1999 08-2001
ASAS Block II 12-02-1993 Mod NA 08-1993 07-1999 12-1999
ASAS Block II 12-02-1994 Mod NA 10-1993 07-1999 12-1999
ASAS Block II 12-02-1995 Mod NA 10-1993 07-1999 12-1999
ASAS Block II 12-02-1996 Mod NA 10-1993 04-1999 06-2000
ASAS Block II 12-02-1997 Mod NA 10-1993 03-2000 09-2000
MCS Block III 12-03-1991 Mod NA 04-1993 12-1993 12-1994
MCS Block III 12-03-1992 Mod NA 04-1993 NA NA
MCS Block III 12-03-1993 Mod NA 04-1993 NA NA
MCS Block III 12-03-1994 Mod NA 04-1993 06-1997 11-1997
MCS Block III 12-03-1995 Mod NA 04-1993 06-1997 06-1998
MCS Block III 12-03-1996 Mod NA 04-1993 09-1998 02-1999
MCS Block III 12-01-1997 Mod NA 04-1993 12-1998 02-1999
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ATACMS/APAM BL 1A 12-02-1993 Mod NA 02-1994 01-1997 02-1998
ATACMS/APAM BL 1A 12-03-1994 Mod NA 02-1994 10-1997 02-1998
ATACMS/APAM BL1A 12-02-1995 Mod NA 02-1994 03-1997 02-1998
ATACMS/APAM BL 1A 12-01-1996 Mod NA 02-1994 03-1997 08-1997
ATACMS/APAM BL 1A 12-01-1997 Mod NA 02-1994 03-1998 02-1998
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Table A12. CTAT Raw Cycle Time Data (Modifications)
ProgramName Mod/NS Doc Date Status MSI MSII MSIIIb END
HELICOPTER
CH-47D (Chinook) D Model 12-01-1978 Mod NA 10-1975 09-1980 02-1984
CH-47D (Chinook) D Model 12-01-1979 Mod NA 10-1975 09-1980 02-1984
CH-47D (Chinook) D Model 12-01-1980 Mod NA 10-1975 10-1980 02-1985
CH-47D (Chinook) D Model 12-01-1981 Mod NA 10-1975 10-1980 02-1984
CH-47D (Chinook) D Model 12-01-1982 Mod NA 10-1975 10-1980 02-1984
CH-47D (Chinook) D Model 12-01-1983 Mod NA 10-1975 10-1980 02-1984
CH-47D (Chinook) D Model 12-01-1984 Mod NA 10-1975 10-1980 02-1984
CH-47D (Chinook) D Model 12-01-1985 Mod NA 10-1975 10-1980 02-1984
CH-47D (Chinook) D Model 12-01-1986 Mod NA 10-1975 10-1980 02-1984
CH-47D (Chinook) D Model 12-01-1987 Mod NA 10-1975 10-1980 02-1984
CH-47D (Chinook) D Model 12-01-1988 Mod NA 10-1975 10-1980 02-1984
CH-47D (Chinook) D Model 12-01-1989 Mod NA 10-1975 10-1980 02-1984
CH-47D (Chinook) D Model 12-01-1990 Mod NA 10-1975 10-1980 02-1984
CH-47D (Chinook) D Model 12-01-1991 Mod NA 10-1975 10-1980 02-1984
CH-47D (Chinook) D Model 12-01-1992 Mod NA 10-1975 10-1980 02-1984
KIOWA Warrior - 12-01-1982 Mod NA 09-1981 06-1985 07-1986
KIOWA Warrior - 12-01-1983 Mod NA 09-1981 06-1985 07-1986
KIOWA Warrior - 12-01-1984 Mod NA 09-1981 06-1985 07-1986
KIOWA Warrior - 12-01-1985 Mod NA 09-1981 06-1985 07-1987
KIOWA Warrior - 12-01-1986 Mod NA 09-1981 06-1985 07-1987
KIOWA Warrior - 12-01-1987 Mod NA 09-1981 10-1985 05-1987
KIOWA Warrior - 12-01-1988 Mod NA 09-1981 10-1985 05-1987
KIOWA Warrior - 12-01-1989 Mod NA 09-1981 10-1985 05-1987
KIOWA Warrior - 12-01-1991 Mod NA 09-1981 10-1985 05-1987
KIOWA Warrior - 12-01-1992 Mod NA 09-1981 10-1985 05-1987
KIOWA Warrior - 12-01-1993 Mod NA 09-1981 10-1985 05-1987
KIOWA Warrior - 12-01-1994 Mod NA 09-1981 10-1985 05-1987
KIOWA Warrior - 12-01-1995 Mod NA 09-1981 10-1985 05-1987
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Table A13. CTAT Raw Cycle Time Data
ProgramName PrgmStart-IOC MSI-IOC MSI-MSII MSI-MSIII MSII-IOC MSII-MSIII MSIIMOC
C31
AFATDS 128 128 62 119 66 57 9
AFATDS 136 136 62 121 74 59 15
AFATDS 136 136 62 121 74 59 15
AFATDS 139 139 62 127 77 65 12
AFATDS 146 146 62 138 84 76 8
AFATDS 147 147 62 139 85 77 8
AFATDS 152 152 64 139 88 75 13
AFATDS 152 152 64 139 88 75 13
AN/TTC-39 105 105 22 105 83 83
AN/TTC-39 110 110 22 110 88 88
AN/TTC-39 120 120 22 126 98 104 -6
AN/TTC-39 120 120 22 126 98 104 -6
AN/TTC-39 120 120 22 112 98 90 8
AN/TTC-39 126 126 22 112 104 90 14
AN/TTC-39 128 128 22 97 106 75 31
AN/TTC-39 129 129 22 97 107 75 32
AN/TTC-39 129 129 22 97 107 75 32
AN/TTC-39 129 129 22 97 107 75 32
AN/TTC-39 129 129 22 97 107 75 32
SCAMP 72 72 5 50 67 45 22
SCAMP 72 72 5 50 67 45 22
SCAMP 72 72 5 35 67 30 37
SMART-T 106 106 15 92 91 77 14
SMART-T 106 106 15 92 91 77 14
SMART-T 106 106 15 92 91 77 14
SMART-T 106 106 15 92 91 77 14
SMART-T 106 106 15 92 91 77 14
SMART-T 106 106 15 93 91 78 13
Longbow Apache 129 129 59 105 70 46 24
Longbow Apache 140 140 64 136 76 72 4
Longbow Apache 140 140 64 134 76 70 6
Longbow Apache 148 148 64 146 84 82 2
Longbow Apache 148 148 64 123 84 59 25
Longbow Apache 148 148 64 122 84 58 26
Longbow Apache 148 148 64 122 84 58 26
Longbow Apache 158 158 64 122 94 58 36
Longbow Apache 158 158 64 122 94 58 36
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Table A14. CTAT Raw Cvcle Time Data
ProgramName PrgmStart-IOC MSI-IOC MSI-MSII MSI-MSIII MSII-IOC MSII-MSIII MSIII-IOC
HELICOPTERS
AH-64 (Apache) 149 149 44 105
AH-64 (Apache) 50
AH-64 (Apache) 149 149 50 97 99 47 52
AH-64 (Apache) 144 144 51 92 93 41 52
AH-64 (Apache) 150 150 51 98 99 47 52
AH-64 (Apache) 150 150 51 98 99 47 52
AH-64 (Apache) 162 162 51 110 111 59 52
AH-64 (Apache) 148 148 51 111 97 60 37
AH-64 (Apache) 154 154 51 114 103 63 40
AH-64 (Apache) 154 154 51 114 103 63 40
AH-64 (Apache) 155 155 51 114 104 63 41
AH-64 (Apache) 163 163 51 114 112 63 49
AH-64 (Apache) 167 167 51 114 116 63 53
AH-64 (Apache) 166 166 51 114 115 63 52
AH-64 (Apache) 166 166 51 114 115 63 52
AH-64 (Apache) 166 166 51 114 115 63 52
AH-64 (Apache) 166 166 51 114 115 63 52
AH-64 (Apache) 166 166 51 114 115 63 52
AH-64 (Apache) 166 166 51 114 115 63 52
AH-64 (Apache) 166 166 51 114 115 63 52
RAH-66 (Comanche) 107 107 101 107 101 6
RAH-66 (Comanche) 101 101 101 101 101
RAH-66 (Comanche) 92 92 32 91 60 59 1
RAH-66 (Comanche) 101 101 30 101 71 71
RAH-66 (Comanche) 102 102 30 101 72 71 1
RAH-66 (Comanche) 126 126 75 125 51 50 1
RAH-66 (Comanche)
RAH-66 (Comanche) 175 175 112 173 63 61 2
RAH-66 (Comanche) 175 175 112 173 63 61 2
RAH-66 (Comanche) 217 217 160 217 57 57
RAH-66 (Comanche) 217 217 160 217 57 57
RAH-66 (Comanche) 217 217 160 217 57 57
RAH-66 (Comanche) 222 222 160 217 62 57 5
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 96 96 14 70 82 56 26
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 96 96 14 70 82 56 26
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 96 96 64 92 32 28 4
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 98 98 14 98 84 84
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 98 98 14 98 84 84
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 98 98 14 98 84 84
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 98 98 14 99 84 85 -1
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 101 101 14 100 87 86 1
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 101 101 14 100 87 86 1
UH-60A (Blackhawk) 101 101 14 100 87 86 1
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Table A15. CTAT Raw Cycle Time Data
ProgramName PrgmStart-IOC MSI-IOC MSI-MSII MSI-MSIII MSII-IOC MSII-MSIII MSIII-IOC
PGM
ATACMS - BAT 155 155 75 142 80 67 13
ATACMS - BAT 179 179 75 165 104 90 14
ATACMS - BAT 179 179 75 165 104 90 14
ATACMS - BAT 209 209 75 187 134 112 22
ATACMS - BAT 209 209 75 187 134 112 22
ATACMS - BAT 209 209 75 187 134 112 22
ATACMS - BAT 211 211 75 195 136 120 16
COPPERHEAD 74 74 21 74 53 53
COPPERHEAD 80 80 21 79 59 58 1
COPPERHEAD 84 84 21 84 63 63
COPPERHEAD 90 90 21 87 69 66 3
COPPERHEAD 98 98 21 77
COPPERHEAD 98 98 21 77
COPPERHEAD 103 103 21 82
COPPERHEAD 111 111 21 90
COPPERHEAD 111 111 21 90
COPPERHEAD 111 111 21 90
COPPERHEAD 111 111 21 90
COPPERHEAD 111 111 21 90
COPPERHEAD 111 111 21 90
COPPERHEAD 111 111 21 123 90 102 -12
SADARM 116 116 40 115 76 75 1
SADARM 130 130 40 127 90 87 3
SADARM 160 160 40 154 120 114 6
SADARM 176 176 40 169 136 129 7
SADARM 176 176 40 169 136 129 7
SADARM 176 176 40 169 136 129 7
SADARM 176 176 40 169 136 129 7
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Table A16. CTAT Raw Cycle Time Data
ProgramName PrgmStart-IOC MSI-IOC MSI-MSII MSI-MSIII MSII-IOC MSII-MSIII MSIII-IOC
TACTICAL MISSILE
AAWS-M (Javelin) 115 115 37 97 78 60 18
AAWS-M (Javelin) 115 115 37 97 78 60 18
AAWS-M (Javelin) 128 128 37 119 91 82 9
AAWS-M (Javelin) 128 128 37 119 91 82 9
AAWS-M (Javelin) 128 128 37 116 91 79 12
AAWS-M (Javelin) 123 123 37 86
AAWS-M (Javelin) 123 123 37 86
AAWS-M (Javelin) 125 125 37 88
AAWS-M (Javelin) 125 125 37 132 88 95 -7
AGM-114(Hellfire) 125 125 38 107 87 69 18
AGM-114(Hellfire) 131 131 38 109 93 71 22
AGM-114(Hellfire) 131 131 38 109 93 71 22
AGM-114(Hellfire) 142 142 38 104
AGM-114(Hellfire) 145 145 38 107
AGM-114(Hellfire) 151 151 38 113
AGM-114(Hellfire) 151 151 38 111 113 73 40
AGM-114(Hellfire) 151 151 38 111 113 73 40
AGM-114(Hellfire) 160 160 38 111 122 73 49
AGM-114(Hellfire) 164 164 38 111 126 73 53
AGM-114(Hellfire) 163 163 38 111 125 73 52
AGM-114(Hellfire) 163 163 38 111 125 73 52
AGM-114(Hellfire) 163 163 38 111 125 73 52
AGM-114(Hellfire) 163 163 38 111 125 73 52
AGM-114(Hellfire) 163 163 38 111 125 73 52
AGM-114(Hellfire) 163 163 38 111 125 73 52
AGM-114(Hellfire) 163 163 38 111 125 73 52
AGM-114(Hellfire) 163 163 38 111 125 73 52
ATACMS/APAM 146 146 94 52
ATACMS/APAM 146 146 94 137 52 43 9
ATACMS/APAM 146 146 94 137 52 43 9
ATACMS/APAM 147 147 94 142 53 48 5
ATACMS/APAM 149 149 94 149 55 55
ATACMS/APAM 148 148 94 151 54 57 -3
ATACMS/APAM 148 148 94 151 54 57 -3
ATACMS/APAM 148 148 94 151 54 57 -3
ATACMS/APAM 148 148 94 151 54 57 -3
ATACMS/APAM 148 148 94 151 54 57 -3
ATACMS/APAM 148 148 94 151 54 57 -3
LANCE 113 113 59 91 54 32 22
LANCE 113 113 59 96 54 37 17
LANCE 113 113 59 96 54 37 17
LANCE 113 113 59 96 54 37 17
LANCE 113 113 59 96 54 37 17
LANCE 113 113 59 96 54 37 17
LANCE 113 113 59 99 54 40 14
LANCE 113 113 59 96 54 37 17
LANCE 113 113 59 96 54 37 17
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Table A17. CTAT Raw Cycle Time Data
ProgramName PrgmStart-IOC MSI-IOC MSI-MSII MSI-MSIII MSII-IOC MSII-MSIII MSIIMOC
TACTICAL MISSILE
Longbow Hellfire 140 140 64 136 76 72 4
Longbow Hellfire 140 140 64 136 76 72 4
Longbow Hellfire 149 149 64 148 85 84 1
Longbow Hellfire 149 149 64 148 85 84 1
Longbow Hellfire 149 149 64 148 85 84 1
Longbow Hellfire 148 148 64 122 84 58 26
Longbow Hellfire 155 155 64 122 91 58 33
Longbow Hellfire 155 155 64 146 91 82 9
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Table A 18. CTAT Raw Cycle Time Data
ProgramName PrgmStart-IOC MSI-IOC MSI-MSII MSI-MSIII MSII-IOC MSII-MSIII MSIII-IOC
VEHICLES
Crusader 158 158 142 16
Crusader 158 158 142 16
Crusader 158 158 76 142 82 66 16
Crusader 130 130 71 132 59 61 -2
M1 Abrams 97 97 48 99 49 51 -2
M1 Abrams 97 97 48 103 49 55 -6
M1 Abrams 98 98 48 107 50 59 -9
M1 Abrams 98 98 48 107 50 59 -9
M1 Abrams 98 98 48 107 50 59 -9
M1 Abrams 98 98 48 107 50 59 -9
M1 Abrams 98 98 48 107 50 59 -9
M1 Abrams 98 98 48 107 50 59 -9
M1 Abrams 98 98 48 107 50 59 -9
MICV (Bradley) 76 76 7 69
MICV (Bradley) 83 83 7 76
MICV (Bradley) 91 91 7 84
MICV (Bradley) 123 123 7 116
MICV (Bradley) 123 123 7 116
MICV (Bradley) 123 123 7 93 116 86 30
MICV (Bradley) 126 126 7 93 119 86 33
MICV (Bradley) 126 126 7 93 119 86 33
MICV (Bradley) 138 138 7 93 131 86 45
MICV (Bradley) 138 138 7 93 131 86 45
MICV (Bradley) 138 138 7 93 131 86 45
MICV (Bradley) 138 138 7 93 131 86 45
MICV (Bradley) 138 138 7 93 131 86 45
MICV (Bradley) 138 138 7 93 131 86 45
MICV (Bradley) 138 138 7 93 131 86 45
MICV (Bradley) 138 138 7 93 131 86 45
MICV (Bradley) 138 138 7 93 131 86 45
MICV (Bradley) 138 138 7 93 131 86 45
MICV (Bradley) 138 138 7 93 131 86 45
MICV (Bradley) 138 138 7 93 131 86 45
PLS (FHTV) 56 56 12 35 44 23 21
PLS (FHTV) 59 59 12 58 47 46 1
PLS (FHTV) 65 65 12 63 53 51 2
PLS (FHTV) 69 69 12 66 57 54 3
PLS (FHTV) 76 76 12 67 64 55 9
PLS (FHTV) 82 82 12 67 70 55 15
PLS (FHTV) 81 81 12 67 69 55 14
PLS (FHTV) 81 81 12 67 69 55 14
PLS (FHTV) 81 81 12 67 69 55 14
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M1 Abrams A1 20
M1 Abrams A1 20
M1 Abrams A1 20
M1 Abrams A2 51
M1 Abrams A2 54
M1 Abrams A2 54
M1 Abrams A2 50
M1 Abrams Upgrade 78
M1 Abrams Upgrade 78
M1 Abrams Upgrade 78
M1 Abrams Upgrade 82
M1 Abrams Upgrade 82
M1 Abrams Upgrade 82























































MSI-MSII MSI-MSIII MSII-IOC MSII-MSIII MSIII-IOC
53 100 59 47 12
53 100 59 47 12
60 104 52 44 8






















Table A21. CTAT Raw Cycle Time Data (Modifications)
ProgramName PrgmStart-IOC MSI-IOC MSI-MSII MSI-MSIII MSN-IOC MSII-MSIII MSIII-IOC
TAC MISSILE
AGM-114(Hellfire) 65 65 46 19
AGM-114(Hellfire) 65 65 46 19
STINGER - RMP 50 50 41 9
STINGER - RMP 39 39 26 13
STINGER - RMP 38 38 26 12
STINGER - RMP 42 42 26 16
STINGER - RMP 45 45 26 19
STINGER - RMP 55 55 26 29
STINGER - RMP 62 62 42 20
STINGER - RMP 62 62 42 20
STINGER - RMP 62 62 42 20
STINGER - RMP 62 62 42 20
STINGER -RMP 62 62 42 20
STINGER - RMP 62 62 42 20
ATACMS/APAM 48 48 35 13
ATACMS/APAM 48 48 44 4
ATACMS/APAM 48 48 37 11
ATACMS/APAM 42 42 37 5
ATACMS/APAM 48 48 49 -1
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APPENDIX B: COST DATA TABLES
This appendix provides the summary cost data tables that are generated from cost
information extracted directly from the program SARs. These tables are used to generate
the cost figures in Chapters IV and V.
Table Bl. Comparison of Adjusted and Unadjusted Cost Growth Data
Proqram SAP Est Base Initial Esl imate Base-Year Current Estimate Base-Year Base Year Schedule Cosl Vanance Base Year Quantity
Name Date Type Year Dev Procurement Dev Procurement Dev Procurement Vanance
Cost Cosl Cost Cost Cost Cost DEV PROC
AFATDS 1997 PdE 96 560 535.9 6318 565 305 132
Adiusted 1995 DE 96 455 6 547 8 561 5 559 -4 3 1387
AN/TTC-39 1984 DE 74 129 487 4 1988 193 2 5 1 -828 136 9
Adiusted 1984 DE 74 129 4874 1875 158 3 51 -828 -1322
SCAMP 1994 DE 92 153 7 163 5 1113 109 -20 7
Adjusted 1994 DE 92 153 7 163 5 111 3 109 -20 7
SMART-T 1997 DE 9? 206.2 5982 249 3467 3 -34 6
Adiusted 1997 DE 92 206 2 5982 249 3467 3 -34 6
Lonqbow Apache 1997 PdE 96 15236 58861 1471 7 7TJ613
Adjusted 1995 DE 96 13572 48188 1467 7 58719 -11 6
AI+64 (Apache) 1992 DE 72 6094 1283 7313 3142 1 94 6 46 2 541 6
Adiusted 1992 DE 72 609 4 1283 726 4 3458 7 80.1 68 8 744 7
RAI+66 (Comanche) 1997 PE 84 1756 2 TBD 5799 TBD 145.2 459 1
Adiusted 1997 PE 84 1756 2 TBD 53688 TBD 145 2 459 1
UH60A (Blackhawk) 1981 DE 71 3572 1584 4 3664 2443 4 1 4 -1068 -20 2
Adjusted 1981 DE 71 3572 1584 4 3602 20022 03 iK 6 -20 2
ATACMS • BAT 1997 DE 91 4885 19126 462 2 1523 6 17 1 17
Adjusted 1993 OE 31 702 1 15699 1367 7 12104 -03 -4046
COPPERHEAD 1988 DE 75 109 3 783 1346 571 4 -88 158 2 -1 7 -582 2
Adiusted 1998 DE 75 1093 783 135.7 571.4 -7 7 1385 -953 1
SAOARM 1997 DE 89 237 7 248 356 2 13507 64 2042 461 7
Adjusted 1997 DE 89 237 7 248 355 2 13507 64 2042 461 "
AAWS-M (Javelin) 1997 PdE 90 5492 28496 736 1 2394 97 | 10895
Adiusted 1996 DE 90 5492 2849 6 736 1 2394 97 1 1 10895
AGM-114 (Helrfire) 1993 DE 75 211 9 276 7 281 7055 9 1 955 -2 7 165 4
Adiusted 1991 DE 75 211 9 276 7 2834 717 4 9 1 100 5 5 2904
ATACMS/APAM BU 1995 PdE 91 6506 8464 732 4 15775 409 364
Ad|usted 1990 DE 91 757 8 5634 6506 8464 -01 • 493
LANCE 1977 DE 70 417 8 2202 450 6 477 3 221 356 06 182 7
AOiusied 1977 DE 70 417 8 2202 450 5 477 3 221 35 6 -06 182 7
Lonqbow Helrfire 1997 PdE 96 3866 2249 455 3 1944 8 -1 1 -41 8
Adiusted 1995 DE 96 3463 1534 7 462 1 1930 6 3235
Crusader 1997 PE 95 2357 TBD 26696 156 2 1186
Adjusted 1997 PE 95 2357 TBD 26698 156 2 1186
Ml Abrams 1991 DE 72 1128 56045 2117 3 209351 103 3 8845 6
Adjusted 1985 DE 72 422 6 1970 2 575 5542 6 194 6 1830 4
Bradley 1992 DE 72 963 227 3 374 8 29442 138 ?9 8 D 9023
Adiusted 1991' DE 72 983 3763 2596 14622 78 5 11 1 321 7
PLSfFHTV) 19% PdE 93 395 16558 469 11307 360 4
Adjusted 1992 DE 93 44 1 19229 449 1034 1 -02 c -8986
143
Table B2. Comparison of Adjusted and Unadjusted Cost Growth Data (Modifications)
Program SAR Est Base Initial Estimate Base-Year Current Estimate Base-Year Base Year Schedule Cost Vanance Base Year Quantity
Name Date Type Year Dev Procurement Dev Procurement Dev Procurement Vanance
Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost DEV PROC
BFVS/A3 Upqrade 1997 DE 94 394 1 2703.2 4624 3884 131.7 -3 3
Adjusted 1997 DE 94 394 1 2703 2 4624 3884 131.7 -3 3
M1A1 |COSTNOTBR MOUTL—
M1A2
M1 Abrams Upqrade 1997 PdE 95 755 4 60283 849.8 6166.5 3777
Adjusted 1994 DE 95 5561 43515 780 9 57735 61 4
ATACMS - BAT P3I
ATACMS BAT BL II |COST NOT BROKEN OUT [~
ATACMS - BAT IIA
C3i . '. if ''>.'.''. • / . T*»JKg^S!rjry^\KE^q|^|^PJ^B^p^trft
ASAS
MCS BL III ^^^v^^^r
AGM-114 (Hellfire)
STINGER RMP 1994 PdE S3 523 2215 3 461 1138.2 846 666 8
Adjusted
ATACMS/APAM BUA ICOST NOT BROKEN OUT I
heucopter 1 st >. ^i^TSwHVrvtTCj^Bi^^^H^sn^^^Bl
CH-47D (Chinook) 1992 DE 75 751 8064 863 1317 41 4 2356
Adjured 1992 DE 75 761 806 4 863 1317 41 4 2356
WOWA Wamor 1995 DE 32 2135 1454 4 241.6 19605 106.2 -397 7
Adjusted 1995 DE 82 2135 14544 241.6 1960.5 1062 -361
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Table B3. Adjusted Cost Growth Data
Program SAR Est Base Initial Estimate Base- Year Current Estimate Base-Year Base Year Schedule Cost Vanance Base Year Quantity
Name Date Type Year Dev Procurement Dev Procurement Oe. Procurement Vanance
Cost Cost Cof Cost Cost Cost DP/ PROC
AfATDS Adiusted 1995 DE 96 455 6 547 8 561 5 555 4:
AN/TTC-39 Adjusted 1981 DE 74 129 487 4 1875 1583 51 -828
-1322
SCAMP Adiusted 1994 DE 92 1537 163 5 111 3 109
-20 7
SMART-T Adiusted 1997 DE 92 206 2 5982 249 3467 3 34 6
LB APAHCHE Adjusted 1995 DE 96 13S72 4818 8 1467 7 5871 9 -11 6
AH-64A Adiusted 1992 DE 72 6094 1283 7264 3458 7 801 688 744 7
RAH-66 Adiusted 1997 PE 84 1756 2 53688 145 2 4591
UH6QA Adjusted 1981 CE 71 3572 15844 3602 20022 03 -1058 •20 2
ATACMS-BATAdiusted 1993 DE 91 702 1 15699 13677 1210 4 -03
-4C46
COPPERHEAD Adiusted 1988 DE 75 109 3 783 1357 571 4 -7 7 1385 -9531
SADARM Adjusted 1997 DE 89 2377 248 3S52 13507 64 2C42 461 7
JAVEUN Adiusted 1996 DE 90 5492 28496 7361 2394 971 1
-10B9 5
AGM-1 14 HF Adiusted 1991 DE 75 2119 276 7 2834 717 4 9 1 100 5 5 2904
ATAMS/APAM Ad|usted 1990 DE 91 757 8 5634 6506 8464 -01 1 493
LANCE Adiusted 1977 DE 70 417 8 2202 450 5 477 3 221 356 -06 1827
LONGBOW HF Adjusted 1995 DE 96 3463 1534 7 4621 1930 6 3235
CRUSADER Adjusted 1997 PE 95 2357 2669 6 1562 J 1166
Ml ABRAHMS Adjusted 1985 DE 72 422 6 19702 575 5542 6 194 6 1830 4
BRADLEY Adiusted 1992 DE 72 983 3763 2596 14622 78 5 -11
1
-321 7
PLS (FHTV) Adjusted 1992 DE 93 44 1 1922 9 449 1034 1 -02
-esee
Proqram SAR Sr, Base Initial Estimate Base-Year Current Estimate Base-Year Base Year Schedule Cost Vanance Base Ye. r Quantity
Name Dale Type Year Dev Procurement Dev Procurement Dev Procurement Vanance
Cosi Cost Cosi Cost Cost Cosi DEV PROC
VEHICLES
BFVS/A3 UG Adiusted 199: DE 94 394 1 2703 2 462 4 3884 1317 -3 3
M1A1 Im^r K|r-q- pDnK-pw m rr 1
M1A2
M1 ABRAMS UG Adjusted 1994 DE 95 6561 4351 5 730 9 57735 61 4
ATACMS - BAT P3I I








^LUol IJUl UkUW-NUUI f
AGM-114(Hellfire)
STINGER - RMP Adjusted 1994 PdE S3 523 2215 3 46 1 11382 846 SB£
ATACMS/APAM BUA COST NOT BROKEN OUT I
HELICOPTER
CH-47D Adiusted 1992 DE 75 76 1 806 4 86.3 1317 41 4 :j5 5 1
KIOWA Adjusted 1995 DE 82 213 5 1454 4 2416 19605 1062 c -361 I
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Table B4. Cost Growth Factors
Proqram SAR Esl Base Initail Initial Initial TCGF TCGFA STCFG DCGF OCGFA SDCGF PCGF PCGFA SPCGF %SCH
Name Date Type Year Total RDTE PROC % Total
Est Est Est Chanrje
AFATDS 1995 DE 96 1003 4 455.6 547 8 1 117 0.978 0.996 1 232 1 232 0.991 1020 0767 1 000 1991%
AN/TTC-39 1984 DE 74 616 4 129 487 4 561 0775 874 1 453 1.453 1 040 0325 0596 0630 56 14%
SCAMP 1994 DE 92 317.2 153.7 163.5 0.695 0.760 1.000 724 0.724 1000 667 0793 1000 00%
SMART-T 1997 DE 92 8044 206 2 598.2 0.741 0.784 1 004 1208 1.208 1000 0580 637 1005 -1.72%
Longbow Apache 1995 DE 96 6176 13572 4818 8 1.188 1.188 0998 1081 1.081 1 000 1.219 1 219 0.998 -100%
TOTAL 8917 4 23017 6615 7 4.301 4486 4872 5699 5.699 5030 3 810 4012 4.833 73.33%
AVERAGE
HELICOPTERS
1783 48 460.34 1323.14 0.860 0.897 974 1.140 1.140 1.006 0.762 0802 967 14.67%
AH-64 (Apache) 1992 DE 72 1892 4 6094 1283 2.212 1.818 1 079 1 192 1 192 1 131 2696 2115 1.054 962%
RAH-66 (Comanche) 1997 PE 84 1756 2 17562 3.057 2.796 1083 3057 2.796 1083 0000 00GO 0000 4 60%
UH-60A packhawk) 1981 DE 71 19416 3572 15844 1217 1.227 0946 1008 1065 1001 1 264 1 264 0.933 -23 92%
TOTAL 5590.2 27228 28674 6.485 5.841 3.107 5257 5.053 3215 3959 3379 1.987 -9.70%
AVERAGE
PGM
1663 4 907 6 1433 7 2.162 1.947 1 036 1 752 1.684 1072 t 980 1690 0993 -3.23%
ATACMS - BAT 1997 DE 91 2272 7021 15699 1.135 1.313 1.000 1948 1.948 1 000 771 1.029 1.000 -0 04%
COPPERHEAD 1989 DE 75 8923 109 3 783 0.792 1.861 1 147 1242 1.242 0930 0730 1 947 1 177 17.03%
SADARM 1997 DE 89 4857 237 7 248 3.512 2.562 1 434 1 494 1 494 1027 5446 3585 1.823 27 77%
TOTAL 3650 10491 2600.9 5.439 5.735 3580 4684 4.684 2956 6947 6560 4000 44 76%
AVERAGE
TACTICAL MISSILE
1216 7 349 7 866.967 1613 1.912 1.193 1.561 1.561 0.965 2.316 2187 1 333 14 92%
AAWS-M (Javelin) 1996 DE 90 33988 549 2 28496 0921 1 241 1029 1340 1.338 1 177 0840 1 222 1000 11 84%
AGM-114 (Hellfire) 1991 DE 75 4886 2119 276 7 2.048 1.453 1 224 1337 1.335 1.043 2593 1543 1 363 49 53%
ATACMS/APAM 8U 1990 DE 91 1321.2 757 8 5634 1.133 0.759 1 000 0859 0.857 1.000 1.502 627 1.000 03%
LANCE 1977 DE 70 638 417.8 2202 1.454 1.169 1 090 1078 1.080 1.053 2.168 1.338 1.162 53.57%
Lonqbow Heltfire 1995 DE 96 1881 346 3 1534.7 1.272 1.100 1 000 1334 1.334 1000 1 258 1 047 1000 00%
TOTAL
1997 PE 95
77276 2283 54446 6829 5.722 5343 5949 5.945 5.273 8361 5778 5525 114.98%
AVERAGE
VEHICLES
15455 456 6 1088 92 1.366 1 144 1 069 1 190 1 189 1.055 1 672 1 156 1 105 23.00%
Crusader 2357 2357 1.133 1.082 1.066 1 133 1.133 1.066 0000 0000 0000 80 43%
M1 Abrams 1991 DE 72 23928 422 6 19702 2.557 1 792 1081 1361 1.361 1.000 2813 1884 1099 10 27%
MICV (Bradley) 1992 DE 72 474 6 983 376 3 3 628 4329 1 165 2 641 2754 1000 3886 4 741 1.209 4 97%
PLS(FHTV) 1992 DE 93 1967 44 1 19229 0.549 1005 1000 1018 1.018 1000 0538 1005 1000 -1.89%
TOTAL 7191.4 2922 4269 4 7.866 8.209 4313 6152 6.265 4066 7237 7.630 3.307 93.79%
AVERAGE 1797 9 730 5 1423 13 1966 2052 1 078 1538 1.566 1 017 2412 2.543 1.102 23 45%
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Table B5. Cost Growth Factors (Modifications)
MODIFICATIONS
Program SAR Est Base Inilacl Initial Initial TCGF TCGFA STCFG DCGF DCGFA SDCGF PCGF PCGFA
Name Date Type Year Total RDTE PROC
VEHICLES
Est Est Est
BFVS/A3 Upgrade 1997 DE 94 3097.3 394.1 2703.2 1.40 1.40 | 1 04 | |.17 1.18 1 DO I 44 1 44
MIA1
Iff5T NCT BROKEN OUT
M1A2
Ml Abrams Upgrade 1994 DE 95 50076 6S6.1 43S1 5 1 31 l 31 1 01 1 19 1.19 1.00 1 33 1 33
TOTAL 81049 1050.2 7054.7 2.712 2.712 2.055 2364 2.371 2000 2764 2.762
AVERAGE
PGM
4052 5 525.1 3527 35 1.356 1 356 1.027 1.182 1.186 1 000 1 382 1.381





AGM-l14(Helltire) ~CCST NOT BROKEN OUl|
STINGER - RMP 1994 PdE 83 IpcE ESTIMATE CNLV]_]_
ATACMS/APAM BLIA
IrrfiT NOT RBOKEN OUT [_
HELICOPTEB
CH-47D (Chinook) 1995 DE 75 882.5 76.1 806 4 1.59 1.32 1.05 1 13 1 13 1 00 1 63 • .J
KIOWA Wamor 1995 DE 82 1667.9 213.5 1454.4 1.32 1.34 1.06 1.13 1 13 1 00 1 35 1 37
TOTAL 7550 4 989 ft ??ftnn ».oin :• nfts 7 111 7 7ftft 7 ?ftft ? noo 1 9R1 7.714
AVERAGE 1775? 144 8 H3Q,<» 1.455 1.333 1.055 1.133 ','33 l 000 1 4 = I.SS7
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APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL CYCLE TIME AND COST GRAPHS
This appendix provides additional graphs that provide more detail for the analysis
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Figure C8. Correlation of STCGF to Schedule Growth Factor
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APPENDIX D: EXPLANATION OF PROGRAM COST
ADJUSTMENTS
This appendix describes the cost adjustments that are made to programs in this
research. This information permits future researchers to duplicate the numbers presented in
this document or to adjust these numbers based on different assumptions and research
objectives. In the correlation analysis, it is important to mention that the schedule growth
factors are adjusted as necessary to correspond to the adjustments made to the cost data. If
an earlier program SAR is used as the cost baseline due to cost adjustments, then the
schedule growth factor is adjusted to that SAR year. This means that only schedule growth
from program start to the adjusted cost baseline SAR year is used in the correlation analysis.
The first step is ensuring that the cost data in the final year SAR is correct. The DoD
7000.3-G SAR guidance states that the Previous Changes plus the Current Changes in the
SAR cost variance section should equal the Previous Changes in the next year SAR. In
other words, the Total Changes amount in the SAR cost variance section should equal the
subtotal in the Previous Changes section of the next year's SAR. "Corrections to Previous
Changes will be shown as Current Changes. For example, if the previous Other Changes of
+15 should have been classified as Estimating, the Current Changes would show - 15 for
Other and +15 for Estimating (DoD 7000.3-G, p.3-1)."
In some cases, the Total Changes amount in a SAR did not equate to the sum of the
Previous Change amounts and the Current Change amounts. In some of the program SARs,
the Total Changes from the previous year SAR do not equal the Previous Change subtotal in
the next year's SAR. Some of the variance categories seem to be adjusted arbitrarily. In
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these cases, the change explanations are analyzed either to allow the adjustment if there is an
explanation or to adjust the cost variance if there is no reasonable explanation. These
adjustments are presented in table format for each program that is adjusted. The table
format includes the SAR year and cost information for the program SAR that is used as the
initial current estimate, which is presented in italics type. Each table then shows the
necessary adjustments, by SAR year, that are made to each program. These adjustments are
shown as they appear in the program SAR.
As an example, use the information in Table Dl. In this case, there is an
unexplained addition of +430.2 in the DEV Previous Cost from 1987 to 1988. This amount
is entered in the table and then subtracted from the Current DEV Estimate to determine the
adjusted cost. If the change had been an unexplained subtraction of a cost then this negative
amount is entered into the table and again subtracted from the Current Estimate, which
results in adding this subtracted cost to the Current Estimate. The last entry in each table is
the adjusted cost information that is utilized for the calculations of the cost growth factors,
which is presented in bold type. The last cost data line in each table corresponds to the cost
data lines in the cost data tables in Appendix B.
Helicopters
Comanche Program
An example of a reasonable explanation occurs in the RAH-66 Comanche program.
There is a discrepancy between the 1989 and 1990 SARs in the schedule variance category.
The Previous Changes section of the 1990 SAR includes +145 in the schedule variance that
did not appear in either of the1989 SAR's Previous Changes or Current Changes sections.
The variance explanation shows that the +145 is added to the schedule variance due to DoD
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direction to rebaseline the program. Although this amount should have been incorporated in
the current variance change section, the explanation makes sense and the cost is not
adjusted.
Table Dl. RAH-66 Cost Adjustment Data
SAR Initial Initial Current Current Sched Sched QTY QTY
Year DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC
Cost Cost Cost Cost Var Cost Var Cost Var Cost Var Cost
1997 1756.2 5799 145.2 459.1
Changes
87-88 430.2
Adj Cost 1756.2 5368.8 145.2 459.1
AH-64A Program
Table D2. AH-66A Cost Adjustment Data
SAR Initial Initial Current Current Sched Sched QTY QTY
Year DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC
Cost Cost Cost Cost Var Cost Var Cost Var Cost Var Cost
7992 609.4 1283 731.3 3142.1 94.6 46.2 541.6
Changes
78-79 37.3 192.7 14.5 69.5
79-80 -.8 -11.4
80-81 .9 -15.6 -96.9
83-84 -5.3 4.8 -2.1
88-89 -32.5 -477 -201
Adj Cost 609.4 1283 726.4 3458.7 80.1 68.8 744.7
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UH-60A Program
Table D3. UH-60A Cost Adjustment Data
SAR Initial Initial Current Current Sched Sched QTY QTY
Year DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC
Cost Cost Cost Cost VarCost Var Cost Var Cost VarCost
1981 357.2 1584.4 366.4 2443.4 1.4 -106.8 -20.2
Changes
78-79 4.7 5.2 1.1
79-80 1.4 -2.2 1.9
80-81 .1 438.2 -2.9
Adj Cost 357.2 1584.4 360.2 2002.2 J 105.6 -20.2
OH-58D Program
Table D4. OH-58D Cost Adjustment Data
SAR Initial Initial Current Current Sched Sched QTY QTY
Year DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC
Cost Cost Cost Cost VarCost VarCost VarCost VarCost
1995 213.5 1454.4 241.6 7960.5 706.2 -397.7
Changes
88-89 -361.6
Adj Cost 213.5 1454.4 241.6 1960.5 106.2 -36.1
There is also an unexplained change in the total amount between 1988 and 1989; however,
this amount is not adjusted. The amount is not adjusted because there is not a program SAR
for 1990. Therefore, it is impossible to determine what happened between 1989 and 1991.
The quantity variances are correct between 1989 and 1991.
Vehicles
Ml Abrams
The Ml Abrams program's last SAR is 1991; however, the cost information for this
program is extracted from the 1985 SAR. The 1985 SAR cost data is used because after
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1985 the Ml modifications, M1A1 and Ml A2, are combined into the Ml SAR. The
schedule and performance data is separated in the SAR but the cost information is
combined. There is no way to separate the cost data based on the program SARs.
Table D5. Ml Abrams Cost Adjustment Data
SAR Initial Initial Current Current Sched Sched QTY QTY
Year DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC
Cost Cost Cost Cost VarCost VarCost Var Cost VarCost





82-83 -5.4 -10.2 -57.4
Adj Cost 422.6 1970.2 575 5542.6 194.6 1830.4
There is also a difference of -778.5 in the PROC cost from 1980 - 1981. This cost is unclear
so calculations with and without this cost are compared to IDA cost growth factors for the
Ml. The calculated cost growth factor, not adjusting for the -778.5, is the closest to the IDA
numbers so this adjustment is not made.
Bradley Program
This program is adjusted to reflect when the actual Bradley program started. From
1973 to 1977, this program is the XM-23, Mechanized Infantry Fighting Vehicle. In 1978,
the program incorporates two systems; the XM2, Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the XM 3,
Cavalry Fighting Vehicle. In 1979, the program actually became the Bradley. The Bradley
program cost is adjusted to only incorporate cost associated with the Bradley. This is
accomplished by subtracting the cost amounts in the Previous Change Section of the 1979
SAR from the final year SAR's Current Estimate.
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Table D6. Bradley Cost Adjustment Data
SAR Initial Initial Current Current Sched Sched QTY QTY
Year DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC
Cost Cost Cost Cost VarCost VarCost VarCost VarCost
1992 98.3 227.3 374.8 2944.2 13.8 79.8 902.3
Changes
Prior 1979 120.6 1484.3 13.8 1.3 11.1 1224
82-83 -5.4 -2.3
Adj Cost 983 376.3 259.6 1462.2 78.5 -11.1 -321.7
The Initial PROC cost is adjusted to reflect the initial baseline. The baseline changed from
376.3 to 227.3 during the life of the program.
The rest of the vehicle programs did not have any adjustments of the type shown
above. The only adjustments to these programs are which final SAR year is used. The PLS
program's 1992 SAR is used because years 1993 - 1996 incorporate PdEs. This also holds
true for the MlA2 Upgrade in which the 1994 SAR is used because the 1995 - 1997 SARs
are PdEs. The last SAR is used for both the Crusader and the BFVS Upgrade.
Tactical Missiles
AGM-114 Hellfire
The following adjustments are made to the Hellfire program.
Table D7. Hellfire Cost Adjustment Data
SAR Initial Initial Current Current Sched Sched QTY QTY
Year DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC
Cost Cost Cost Cost VarCost VarCost Var Cost VarCost
1991 211.9 276.7 287.8 723.1 9.1 94.6 2.7 173.1
Changes




83-84 6.8 12.3 -117.3
Adj Cost 211.9 276.7 283.4 717.4 9.1 100.5 3 290.4
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The 1991 SAR is used for this program because the Hellfire II's cost is included in SAR
years 1992 and 1993.
The rest of the programs in this commodity need no adjustments as shown for the
AGM 1 14. For the Javelin program, the 1996 SAR is used because the 1997 SAR is a PdE.
The 1990 SAR is used for the ATACMS/APAM for the same reason, the 1991 - 1995 SARs
are PdEs. The Longbow Hellfire program's 1995 SAR is used because the years 1996 -
1997 are PdEs. The Lance's last SAR year is used for the cost growth calculations.
C3I
AN/TTC-39
The following adjustments are made to the AN/TTC-39 program.
Table D8. AN/TTC-39 Cost Adjustment Data
SAR Initial Initial Current Current Sched Sched QTY QTY
Year DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC
Cost Cost Cost Cost VarCost VarCost VarCost Var Cost
1984 129 487.4 198.8 193.2 5.1 -82.8 -136.9
Changes




Adj Cost 129 487.4 187.5 1583 5.1 -82.8 -1322
Longbow AH-64
The Longbow AH-64 program data does not include the 1996 and 1997 SARs
because these SARs contain PdEs. This program data includes both the fire control system
and the necessary airframe modification costs. This program is included in the C3I
commodity because the DoD approved CTAT database classifies this program as avionics.
Since this is the only program with an avionics classification, this program is included with
the C3I commodity for this research based on its electronic nature.
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The AFATDS program's 1995 SAR is used because the 1996 and 1997 SARs
contain PdEs. The last year SARs for the SCAMP and the SMART-T programs are used in
the cost growth factor calculations.
PGM
Copperhead
The following adjustments are made to the Copperhead program.
Table D9. Copperhead Cost Adjustment Data
SAR Initial Initial Current Current Sched Sched QTY QTY
Year DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC
Cost Cost Cost Cost Var Cost Var Cost Var Cost Var Cost









Adj Cost 109.3 783 135.7 571.4 -7.7 138.5 -953.1
SADARM
The SADARM program is adjusted to only include the cost data from the SADARM
155mm projectile. Up to 1995 the program also included cost information for a MLRS
SADARM rocket; however, this part of the program was cancelled in 1995.
Table D10. SADARM Cost Adjustment Data
SAR Initial Initial Current Current Sched Sched QTY QTY
Year DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC DEV PROC
Cost Cost Cost Cost Var Cost Var Cost Var Cost Var Cost
1997 237.7 248 356.2 1350.7 6.4 204.2 461.7
Changes
92-93 1
Adj Cost 237.7 248 355.2 1350.7 6.4 204.2 461.7
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The ATACMS/BAT program's 1993 SAR is used because the SARs from 1994 on include
program upgrade combined cost information.
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APPENDIX E: MULTIPLE REGRESSION INFORMATION
This appendix provides the results of additional multiple regression analyses
conducted on the cost growth factors. Table El presents the results of a natural log multiple
regression. In this table, the dependent variables are the natural log cost growth factors. All
of the independent variables are also in natural log form.
Table El. Multiple Regression Analysis
LN Initial LN Initial LN LN LN Initial LN Initial
Dependent Variable Cost Cost SGF SGF Schedule Schedule
Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value
LN TCGF 0.1013 0.4387 1.311 0.0295 1.0374 0.02298
LN TCGFA 0.1518 00624 1.411 0.0005 03048 0.2279
LN STCGF -0.0272 0.3523 0.2152 0.0965 0.0837 0.3733
Table ElA provides the "R2" and "n" values for the dependent variables in Table El.
Table E1A. Multiple Regression Analysis
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